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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

REGULATING PHYSICIAN BEHAVIOR:
TAKING DOCTORS’ “BAD LAW” CLAIMS SERIOUSLY

SANDRA H. JOHNSON*

INTRODUCTION
Physicians are the nerve center of the health care beast. This is so even
after the developments of the past two or three decades in which the hospital
has emerged as a mature organization with interests that it pursues apart from
its medical staff, and health care payers have established extensive
bureaucracies to control physician-driven costs. Physician behavior remains a
key target of government regulation that is intended to improve the efficiency,
quality, and accessibility of health care. In fact, one might say that the core of
the health law enterprise,1 both public and private,2 has been focused on

* Professor Emerita of Law and Health Care Ethics, Saint Louis University School of Law. My
deepest thanks to my colleagues Jesse Goldner and Tim Greaney, who have provided invaluable
counsel on so many of my articles over the years and most especially this one. My thanks also to
my colleague Kathleen Casey, whose research skill and creativity contributed substantially to this
piece, and to my student research assistants Kelly Carroll and Tyler Gibb who persevered
throughout. I am also grateful for the rare opportunity I enjoyed in this symposium. I have long
admired the work of each of the scholars who participated, and I am very grateful for their
insights. Annie Harkins, editor of this Law Journal issue, did a spectacular job of organizing the
conference and working with each of the authors in developing this publication. As always, I
appreciate the special academic community that is Saint Louis University School of Law, and
especially the Center for Health Law Studies, and the support of our Dean, Jeffrey Lewis.
1. An entertaining debate is raging as to whether health law has a “core” and, in fact,
whether the field exists at all. See, e.g., M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CAL.
L. REV. 247 (2003) (considering current models of health law and presenting an alternative model
to guide the development of health law); Symposium, Rethinking Health Law, 41 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 341 (2006); Theodore W. Ruger, Health Law’s Coherence Anxiety, 96 GEO. L.J. 625
(2008).
2. This paper places legislation, litigation, and administrative regulation under the single
umbrella of legal efforts to “regulate” physician behavior. There are significant differences in the
operation and behavior of each of these legal regimes; those differences have been explored
elsewhere. See, e.g., William M. Sage, Unfinished Business: How Litigation Relates to Health
Care Regulation, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 387 (2003). While this paper uses the term
regulation to signify governmental efforts to regulate physician behavior, that term has been used
frequently to include private efforts to determine behavior. This paper does not ignore those
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incentivizing, deterring, and directing physician behavior3 across a wide range
of activities,4 including essential components of the doctor-patient relationship.
More than simply detecting and punishing the maverick doctor, legal
efforts to control physician behavior over the past several decades have aimed
at transforming the practice of medicine. This effort intended to work
fundamental change in both the physician-patient relationship and the relation
of medicine to the market.5
Doctors6 frequently claim that the very law intended to improve the lot of
their patients is instead making the doctors provide poor care.7 These “bad
law” claims are levied against malpractice litigation that makes doctors
practice “defensive medicine”;8 against patients’ rights that make doctors

private efforts, see infra Part II.C, but instead addresses them as distinct from public regulation of
physician behavior.
3. “The historical evolution of the field of health law starts with this central focus on the
physician-patient relationship.” Barry R. Furrow, From the Doctor to the System: The New
Demands of Health Law, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 67, 69 (2004) (describing the expanding scope of
the health law field); see also Elliot S. Fisher et al., Creating Accountable Care Organizations:
The Extended Hospital Medical Staff, 26 HEALTH AFF. W-44 (2006), http://content.health
affairs.org/webexclusives/index.dtl?year=2006 (criticizing the “fragmented system” of care
experienced by patients when regulatory and quality control measures place too much
accountability on individual doctors); Nicolas P. Terry, A Medical Ghost in the E-Health
Machine, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 225, 227 (2004) (identifying the continuing physician-centrism of
health law as a significant weakness).
4. Of course, hospitals are highly regulated as well: “[F]ew entities have been subjected to
more extensive regulatory controls from all governmental levels than the acute care hospital.”
John D. Blum, Feng Shui and the Restructuring of the Hospital Corporation: A Call for Change
in the Face of the Medical Error Epidemic, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 5, 12 (2004).
5. See discussion infra Part I.
6. For a discussion of the problem of over-generalizing the profession by lumping all
doctors together, see infra note 31.
7. Medicine is not entirely hostile to the operation of law within medical practice and, in
fact, medicine often uses law as a tool. For example, medical licensure provided a nascent
allopathic medical profession with both a high degree of legitimacy and the ability to control the
practice of outsiders, including practitioners of other schools of medicine. Restrictive scope of
practice regulation that limits the practice of non-physician health care providers is one
continuing example of the use of law as a shield. See, e.g., Scope of Practice: Allied Health
Professionals Form Coalition to Oppose Efforts to Restrict Their Practices, 15 Health L. Rep.
(BNA) 711 (June 15, 2006) (discussing the American Medical Association’s (AMA) Scope of
Practice Partnership (SOPP), an advocacy group formed to influence state regulation).
8. See e.g., William M. Sage, Malpractice Reform as a Health Policy Problem, 12
WIDENER L. REV. 107, 112–15 (2005) (defining “defensive medicine” as medical care that is
motivated by the avoidance of liability rather than by benefit to patients); see also David M.
Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist Physicians in a Volatile
Malpractice Environment, 293 JAMA 2609, 2612 (2005) (reporting that 93% of physicians
surveyed in Pennsylvania “sometimes or often” engage in at least one form of defensive medicine
due to the threat of malpractice liability).
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provide futile care;9 against controlled substances laws that require them to
neglect their patients in pain10 or to deny their patients the sterile injection
tools that would prevent the spread of disease;11 against antitrust laws that
prevent doctors from organizing themselves in ways that would produce more
cost-effective and accessible care;12 and against regulations that impede
important medical research.13 These “bad law” claims assert that the law’s
effort to promote patient health and well-being has actually caused significant
harm.
These “bad law” claims have often fallen on ears deafened by the reform
effort itself. Changes intended to move the physician-patient relationship to a
more egalitarian or consumer-oriented model, whether through the legal
obligation of informed consent or through the removal of legal barriers
impeding operation of the market, required that traditional claims of
professionalism be weakened or rejected. Legal and policy efforts over the last
several decades thus deconstructed the traditional claims of medical
professionalism about the right relationship of law to medicine. Medicine’s
complaints about defective law came to be characterized as the work of a selfserving guild, rather than a profession motivated by altruism and armed with
expertise, or at least as the work of the recalcitrant “bad apples” who continued
to resist improvements that the more enlightened among them embraced.14
These narratives marginalized physicians’ “bad law” claims and diminished
them as a source of legitimate information about the effectiveness of reform
efforts.
This paper argues that physicians’ “bad law” claims should be taken
seriously and treated as sentinel events that warrant closer consideration.
“Sentinel events,” as the term is currently used in health care quality
improvement, describe incidents that cause injury or present a risk of serious

9. See, e.g., Judith F. Daar, Medical Futility and Implications for Physician Autonomy, 21
AM. J.L. & MED. 221 (1995); Seth Rivera et al., Motivating Factors in Futile Clinical
Interventions, 119 CHEST 1944, 1946 (2001).
10. See discussion infra Part II.D–E.
11. See Scott Burris et al., Harm Reduction in the Health Care System: The Legality of
Prescribing and Dispensing Syringes to Drug Users, 11 HEALTH MATRIX 5 (2001).
12. See Thomas L. Greaney, When Politics and Law Collide: Why Health Care Reform Does
Not Need Antitrust ‘Reform,’ 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 135 (1994).
13. See Symposium, Censorship and Institutional Review Boards, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 399
(2007); see also Kathleen Dracup & Christopher W. Bryan-Brown, The Law of Unintended
Consequences, 13 AM. J. CRITICAL CARE 97, 99 (2004); Jennifer Kulynych & David Korn, The
Effect of the New Federal Medical-Privacy Rule on Research, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 201 (2002);
Beverly Woodward, Challenges to Human Subject Protections in US Medical Research, 282
JAMA 1947 (1999).
14. See discussion infra Part I.
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injury.15 These events are sentinel “because they signal the need for . . .
investigation and response.”16 Doctors’ “bad law” complaints signal that there
may be a risk of harm to patients caused by the effect of law on medical
decisionmaking in particular circumstances.
Again in the parlance of current quality efforts, these signaling events
trigger an obligation to engage in a root cause analysis17 which requires that
one examine sentinel events from the perspective of an entire system rather
than as the failing of individuals.18 It focuses on the performance and
outcomes of the system rather than on attaching fault to individual actors.
Root cause analysis looks at the operation of a system upon the human beings
that work within it rather than simply asking whether the individuals involved
conformed themselves appropriately to the system.19 Importantly for the
arguments in this paper, root cause analysis identifies system changes that
accommodate observed and predictable behavior patterns rather than expecting
these patterns to accommodate themselves to the system.20 Systemic change in
response to the root cause analysis of sentinel events is intended to avoid harm
in the future.21 Its accommodation of the system to established behavior
patterns does not sacrifice quality or patient protection but rather uses these
patterns strategically to better achieve quality and patient safety goals.22
Neither the self-serving guild nor the “few bad apples” narrative of physicians’
“bad law” claims meets the expectations of root cause analysis and system
change.
As the discussion below will show, however, taking “bad law” claims
seriously does not mean that they must be accepted at face value. In fact,
serious testing of such claims should provide the groundwork both for
adjusting legal standards and processes when the complaints are valid and for
rejecting the wholesale abandonment of useful standards and processes when
complaints are not valid. Far from arguing that reformers should retreat from
challenging the medical profession’s claims of bad law, this paper argues that
15. THE JOINT COMMISSION, SENTINEL EVENTS POLICY AND PROCEDURES (July 2007),
available at http://www.jointcommission.org/SentinelEvents/PolicyandProcedures (follow
“Sentinel Events Policy and Procedures”).
16. Id. The Joint Commission requires that accredited hospitals set up systems to detect
sentinel events; particular sentinel events must be reported to the Commission. Id.
17. Root cause analysis was borrowed from other high risk industries and now is embedded
in hospital quality efforts due to the Joint Commission’s requirements. Despite its common use,
the effectiveness of root cause analysis in reducing error and injury has been documented only
anecdotally. See, e.g., Albert W. Wu et al., Effectiveness and Efficiency of Root Cause Analysis
in Medicine, 299 JAMA 685 (2008).
18. THE JOINT COMMISSION, supra note 15.
19. Id.; Wu, supra note 17, at 686.
20. THE JOINT COMMISSION, supra note 15.
21. Wu, supra note 17, at 687.
22. See discussion infra Part IV.
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there is significant work to be done to test whether these claims are, in fact,
dishonest and strategic, mistaken or misinformed, or valid and revealing.
Absent this work, doctors’ bad law claims are likely to have either too much
power or too little power.23 Only by mere accident will the formal response to
these claims further the goals of health policy reformers.
Using specific examples, this paper offers an instrumental analysis of “bad
law” claims as a lens through which it explores the application and translation
of law into medical practice. Each of the “bad law” claims chosen for
discussion involves a claim by doctors that a law intended to produce better
health care is in fact causing them to treat their patients poorly.
There is surprisingly little empirical research devoted to finding out
whether or how doctors alter their behavior in response to legal risk.24
Empirically grounded theories of human behavior contribute significantly to
our understanding of how people make decisions and react to certain forms of
communication, external constraints, and risks; these theories are increasingly
migrating to analysis of law.25 Those behavioral theories may be extrapolated

23. See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, Starr on the Corporatization and Commodification of
Health Care: The Sequel, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 947, 956 (2004) (“My own diagnosis of
why the health care ‘revolution’ failed to topple medicine as a ‘sovereign’ profession . . . [is] that
the American political system is far too committed to compromise and half-measures . . . .”). For
further discussion of the influence of such claims, see infra Part III.
24. Most frequently, the best evidence available as to the influence of law is the ubiquitous
attitude survey in which doctors identify legal requirements as the cause of their self-reported
suboptimal behavior. See, e.g., Flora Johnson Skelly, Fear of Sanctions Limits Prescribing of
Pain Drugs, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 15, 1994, at 13 (reporting that 69% of doctors surveyed said
that the risk of disciplinary action made them more conservative in prescribing opioids for pain,
and that of this group, one-third said their patients thus suffered from untreated pain); HARRIS
INTERACTIVE INC., COMMON GOOD, FEAR OF LITIGATION STUDY: THE IMPACT ON MEDICINE 8
(2002), http://commongood.org/assets/attachments/57.pdf (reporting that 76% of doctors
surveyed stated that concerns about malpractice litigation hurt their ability to provide quality care,
and 79% that they themselves—and 91% have noticed that other physicians—ordered more tests
than necessary due to concerns about malpractice). Attitude surveys of this type are notoriously
unreliable as indicators of either actual behaviors or actual motivations, and some believe that
they may even be used strategically by doctors to achieve certain political goals. See MARSHALL
B. KAPP, OUR HANDS ARE TIED: LEGAL TENSIONS AND MEDICAL ETHICS 29 (1998) (calling
such studies “‘feels bad’ surveys”).
25. Behavioral law and economics, for example, revises the law-and-economics analysis of
the impact of law with a more empirically based understanding of human decisionmaking. See,
e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997). Cognitive
theory generally is applied to a number of areas of law to anticipate and explain how people make
decisions in legally significant contexts. For an inventory of heuristics developed through
cognitive psychology as applied to quality assessment, see Jason Ross Penzer, Note, Grading the
Report Card: Lessons from Cognitive Psychology, Marketing, and the Law of Information
Disclosure for Quality Assessment in Health Care Reform, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 207 (1995). See
also Thomas L. Greaney, Economic Regulation of Physicians: A Behavioral Economics
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further to physicians and could provide a useful framework for hypothesizing
about physician behavior in reaction to fear of legal entanglement. There is a
rather substantial body of research, however, that identifies apparently unique
experiences, motivations, and reactions on the part of physicians. Research
examining the training of physicians, for example, reveals heightened
sensitivity to shame associated with errors, a refined notion of the centrality of
character, and the attachment of serious moral content to breaches of
particular, but not all, standards of behavior.26 In addition, significant distrust
on the part of physicians toward the legal system may influence them to react
differently to legal risks and incentives as compared to other risks and
incentives.27 This research provides some basis for arguing that physicians are
different from the general population and perhaps even from other
professionals. Of course, there are good reasons to believe that doctors are not
unique but are quite like lawyers, and so the potential for borrowing from
empirical research on lawyers to predict the behavior of doctors may be
substantial.28 In regard to legal risk, however, one would expect that the

Perspective, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1189 (2009) (using behavioral economics to explain why the
law’s use of financial incentives and financial regulation of physicians is and is not successful).
26. See, e.g., CHARLES L. BOSK, FORGIVE AND REMEMBER: MANAGING MEDICAL FAILURE
(2d ed. 2003) (the classic study of physician residency training in the late 1970s).
27. Trust has assumed a central position in discussions of efforts to regulate physician
behavior. Most of the literature addressing the difficult issue of the extent to which society, and
patients in particular, generally trusts physicians, explains patterns in the regulation of medical
practice or can be used as a guide for choices in regulatory form. See, e.g., Mark A. Peterson,
From Trust to Political Power: Interest Groups, Public Choice, and Health Care 26 J. HEALTH
POL. POL’Y & L. 1145, 1155–56 (2001). Another trust, or confidence, issue that exists in this
regulatory effort, however, is the trust or distrust that physicians carry for the law. See, e.g.,
William M. Sage, Why Are Demonstrations of Comprehensive Malpractice Reform So (At All)
Controversial?, 37 U. MEM. L. REV. 513, 515 (2007) (“[P]hysicians are demanding reform
because of their own emotions rather than documented fact—that for over a generation they have
been scared of lawyers and that their fear leads them to practice worse medicine.”); see also
ROBERT A. BURT, DEATH IS THAT MAN TAKING NAMES: INTERSECTIONS OF AMERICAN
MEDICINE, LAW, AND CULTURE 69 (2002) (“A 1973 report by a federal commission . . . conveys
the professional paranoia of the time in its opening observation: . . . ‘As one member of the
Commission put it, “As a physician, I live in an aura of fear—fear of suit . . . . It may be hard to
believe but we are a frightened profession . . . . [The doctor] really doesn’t want to believe the
hostility he feels.”’”); Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors:
Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1606 (2002) (arguing that
defensive medicine often occurs “solely (or mostly) to reduce the probability of litigation”);
sources cited infra notes 209, 221–223 (immunity statutes).
28. See, e.g., Diane E. Hoffmann, Are Health Care Conflicts All That Different? A
Contrarian View, 29 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 235 (2008) (arguing that conflicts involving
doctors and patients are more like conflicts involving lawyers and clients than not).
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reactions may be quite distinct due to differing levels of familiarity.29 On the
other hand, studies of physician behavior in relation to financial incentives
tend to show that doctors change their behavior in response to payment and
profit in ways expected of the rest of humankind.30
Furthermore, this paper refers to “doctors” as a single population. Of
course, this device suffers from the weakness of all generalizations: what one
gains in simplicity of reference, one loses in complexity. 31 In the face of the
very thin relevant research on the issues addressed in this paper, however, the
generalization is unavoidable. Finally, even if we had a better understanding
of how doctors generally react to legal risk, it would not resolve the question of
how doctors respond to particular legal requirements or legal risks.32 This
paper proceeds despite, or because of, the significant gaps in relevant empirical

29. J. Douglas Peters et al., An Empirical Analysis of the Medical and Legal Professions’
Experiences and Perceptions of Medical and Legal Malpractice, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 601,
625–29 (1986).
30. See, e.g., Jason Dana & George Loewenstein, A Social Science Perspective on Gifts to
Physicians from Industry, 290 JAMA 252, 252 (2003) (reporting that prescribing patterns respond
to even small financial rewards). But see Paul H. Rubin, An Uncertain Diagnosis, REGULATION,
Summer 2005, at 34, 37–38 (noting that the data does not support conclusions that the
prescriptions were not medically appropriate). Studies on the influence of gifting on physician
practice also do not account for the impact of the pedagogical interventions proven to be effective
in altering physician behavior that accompany these gifts. See Sandra H. Johnson, Polluting
Medical Judgment? False Assumptions in the Pursuit of False Claims Regarding Off-Label
Prescribing, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 78–79 (2008); discussion infra Part III.A.
31. Janet Dolgin argues, for example, that the medical profession is experiencing an
ideological division over the appropriate relationship between medicine and profit. Janet L.
Dolgin, Debating Conflicts: Medicine, Commerce and Contrasting Ethical Orders, 35 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 705, 718–19 (2006). Based on her review of the rhetoric of the debate within medicine,
Dolgin concludes that the more traditional segment of the profession views the relationship
between medicine and the market as one which threatens the focus on healing. Id. at 721–22.
The other segment of the profession assumes that medicine can achieve more good things with
the support of industry than without it. Id. at 722–25; see also M. Gregg Bloche, The Market for
Medical Ethics, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1099, 1106 (2001) (“The [medical] profession
has become a complex mix of overlapping subgroups with both shared and competing
interests.”); John Harley Warner, Grand Narrative and Its Discontents: Medical History and the
Social Transformation of American Medicine, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 757, 769 (2004)
(recognizing that “the medical profession” as a category of analysis is an overgeneralization).
32. Substantial studies of physician reaction to the malpractice system conclude that
physicians generally view it as haphazard, unpredictable, and unfair. See, e.g., Michelle M.
Mello et al., Fostering Rational Regulation of Patient Safety, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 375,
388 (2005) (“One concern [of using tort law to regulate patient safety] is that there is scant
evidence that physicians process the deterrent signal sent by malpractice litigation in a
constructive way.”). It is not known whether the same is true of other legal signals.
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research on physicians’ reactions to legal requirements because there is no
other choice at this point.33
Part I of this paper further explains the context for the sections that follow.
It briefly describes the reform agenda of health law and its relationship to
understandings of claims based on traditional professionalism. This section
also acknowledges significant critiques of evaluating law based solely on its
consequences; and thus, it sets limits on expectations for empirical work.
Part II analyzes “bad law” claims made by physicians in specific contexts.
After acknowledging that some “bad law” claims make a scapegoat of legal
requirements in the service of doctors’ self-interest, this section examines how
common learning and decisionmaking patterns in medicine may lead doctors to
misunderstand specific legal requirements and legal risk. The section then
moves on to consider two situations in which analysis of formal legal
requirements and processes fails to produce any evidence of the bad law that
the doctors claim exists. In each of these two situations, a shadow system may
be operating to confound the expressed intent and purpose of the law. Finally,
the section addresses situations in which scapegoating, misunderstanding, and
shadow systems have each been ruled out as a root cause of the specific “bad
law” claim, leaving one to conclude that the rules simply are wrong.
While often marginalized and misinterpreted, doctors’ “bad law” claims
are not entirely ignored. Part III examines several of the most common
responses to “bad law” claims. Educational efforts to disabuse doctors of their
misunderstanding of the law and overestimation of legal risk are often the
frontline response, and this section begins with an analysis of these efforts.
This section then addresses immunity statutes as a common legislative
response to doctors’ claims that legal risk forces them to behave
inappropriately, and safe harbors as a regulatory effort to create a safe space
for particular activities by restraining prosecutorial discretion. Finally, this
section discusses the legal response to situations in which legal risk is
unbalanced, fails to reflect policy goals, and inappropriately falls on only one
side of a treatment choice. In using these specific examples, this section
explains why “bad law” claims persist despite remedies that would be expected
to be effective.

33. Calls for more empirical research on the impact of law currently permeate legal
scholarship. See, e.g., Carl E. Schneider & Lee E. Teitelbaum, Life’s Golden Tree: Empirical
Scholarship and American Law, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 53, 59–60. Health law scholarship has
begun to respond to this call, albeit in some areas more than others. See Michelle M. Mello &
Kathryn Zeiler, Empirical Health Law Scholarship: The State of the Field, 96 GEO. L.J. 649
(2008); see also Blum, supra note 4, at 20 (noting that “law is often cast as a tool to positively
address some of the causes of medical errors,” but that the literature on medical error has not
considered “the role of law as a causative element” of medical error in its impact on hospital
structure and behavior).
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Part IV makes recommendations on two fronts. First, it calls for a different
framework for evaluating the impact of law on medicine. It argues that the
evaluation of the law as applied should be reframed to examine populationbased effects on the behavior of physicians. Second, Part IV addresses
circumstances in which policy-level decisions relating to enforcement
strategies operate to highjack the formal legal standards that have been put in
place to govern physician practice. In this latter effort, the paper recommends
that regulators audit the performance of the monitoring and investigation
stages of the regulatory process to reduce negative spillover effects.
Specifically, this section argues that regulators should adjust monitoring
systems, by choosing between visible and invisible systems, to accommodate
physician sensitivity to oversight without abandoning the regulatory goal that
the monitoring system seeks to obtain. It also offers a critique of “catch-andrelease” investigation practices, which subject a significantly larger number of
doctors to governmental inquiries with the intention of moving to sanctions on
only a few.
These recommendations do not require reducing the commitment to the
underlying legal requirements. Nor are they another iteration of the familiar
debates over whether regulatory enforcement systems should provide
individual inspectors with discretion and flexibility rather than requiring a
stricter and more rule-oriented process.34 The recommendations do, however,
assume that knowledge of the way that physicians alter their behavior in the
face of legal risk can provide a legitimate tool for the design of regulatory
systems.35 These discrete recommendations also acknowledge that “bad law”
complaints can have substantial political power in the absence of serious
examination and may indeed result in formal responses that undermine the
publicly adopted goals of the regulatory system.
I. THE REFORM EFFORT
A.

Reforming Law to Reform Medicine

To the extent that law imposes standards external to the medical
profession, it departs from the traditional model of professionalism in which
standards of practice emerge from and are enforced by the profession itself.36

34. See, e.g., EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE
PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 34–35 (1982) (describing the “rule versus
discretion” dilemma in regulatory enforcement as “ancient”).
35. See discussion infra Part IV.
36. Of course, medical malpractice law still formally rests primarily on the notion that the
standard of care against which an individual physician’s behavior is to be measured for liability
purposes is that which is evident in contemporary medical practice. See BARRY F. FURROW ET
AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 336–39 (6th ed. 2008). Informed
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The duty of informed consent, for example, one of the fundamental building
blocks of the modern physician-patient relationship, can accurately be viewed
as a creature of the law.37 There is debate about whether the practice of
informed consent grounded as an ethical obligation would have emerged from
within the medical profession itself at a later time without the interference of
judicial opinions.38 Neither the practice of informed consent nor strong
support for the concept, however, had developed within medicine prior to
judicial intervention. Although calls for informed consent to be recognized as
an ethical foundation for medical treatment predated the landmark Canterbury
v. Spence,39 the case law at least accelerated its development if it did not
actually create the concept out of whole cloth. Certainly, for better or worse,
and probably for worse, subsequent legal developments—including statutory
presumptions attached to the execution of the consent form40—contributed
significantly to the current practice of “consenting” patients.41 Similarly, court

consent and the relative authority of doctors and family in decisionmaking at the end of life, both
of which developed at least in part through malpractice litigation and which are discussed in this
paper, are examples of departures from standard practice. See also Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors
Hosp., 452 N.Y.S.2d 875, 880 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (regarding provision of oxygen to
neonates), and Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974) (regarding testing for glaucoma), for
instances in which courts imposed standards of care that exceeded customary practice.
37. See Alan Meisel, Canterbury v. Spence: The Inadvertent Landmark Case, in HEALTH
LAW AND BIOETHICS: CASES IN CONTEXT 9, 33 (Sandra Johnson et al. eds., 2009) (discussing the
significance and context of the case).
38. See JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 52 (1984).
39. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that doctors’ overall
obligation to a patient includes a duty of reasonable disclosure of therapy choices and
corresponding risks); see, e.g., Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W. Scheuneman, Informed Consent to
Therapy, 64 Nw. U. L. Rev. 628, 637–44, 644 n.63 (1969).
40. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6(d) (2006) (providing that a written and signed
consent that “discloses in general terms the treatment or course of treatment . . . shall be
conclusively presumed to be a valid consent in the absence of fraudulent misrepresentations of
material facts”); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.103(4)(a) (West 2005) (providing that a written
and signed consent creates a “rebuttable presumption” of informed consent); IND. CODE ANN. §
34-18-12-2 (LexisNexis 1998) (providing that written consent can create a “rebuttable
presumption” of informed consent); IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.137 (West 2005) (providing that
written consent can create “a presumption” of informed consent).
41. The presumption statutes gut the requirement of informed consent in its broader sense of
patient-centered decisionmaking as an enforceable legal standard, and they can be viewed as an
abandonment of the aspirations for empowerment of patients embedded within that principle. See
Alan Meisel & Lisa D. Kabnick, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment: An Analysis of Recent
Legislation, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 407, 416–17, 467–77 (1980); see also Peter H. Schuck,
Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 932–38 (1994). These statutes may illustrate
collusion between medicine and law, and the capture of state legislatures by the medical
profession. Meisel & Kabnick, supra, at 469. On the other hand, they may simply be a rational
restraint on lawsuits that should leave the normative and signaling effect of the legal requirement
in place. See id. at 415 & n.18, 467–68; Schuck, supra, at 939–47 (advocating for a cost-
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opinions concerning refusal of treatment at the end of life, beginning with
Quinlan, established that the right to make those decisions belonged to the
patient rather than to the physician alone. 42 Again, arguments to that effect
already existed in the literature in ethics43 and moral theology,44 but Quinlan
elevated patient choice in the face of significant resistance among the medical
profession.45 Although some would argue that Quinlan preserved a controlling
role for physicians,46 the decades of legislation and court cases after Quinlan
assumed the primacy of patient choice and tested the boundaries of that choice
as against social norms and practical and conceptual challenges in surrogate
decisionmaking.
These legislative and judicial efforts intended from the start to be more
than routine policing actions. They did not merely strengthen or take over the
enforcement aspect of medical self-regulation; they aimed instead at
transforming customary medical practice. For this reason, health law has been
called a reform movement.47

effectiveness analysis of informed consent to determine if it helps to keep health care costs
down). A similar backing away from the initial goals and principles of antitrust law has also been
observed. See, e.g., Thomas (Tim) Greaney, Thirty Years of Solicitude: Antitrust Law and
Physician Cartels, 7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 189 (2007).
42. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976).
43. See, e.g., LEON R. KASS, LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE DEFENSE OF DIGNITY: THE
CHALLENGE FOR BIOETHICS 201–29 (2002).
44. Pope Pius XII, The Prolongation of Life, Address Before an International Congress of
Anesthesiologists (Nov. 24, 1957), in 4 THE POPE SPEAKS 393, 397 (1958) (stating that the
doctor’s right to continue ventilator support relies on consent from the family or the patient). See
Stanley J. Reiser, View the Third, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.–Dec. 1993, at S13, S14,
discussing Pope Pius XII’s address: “[T]he moment when both the physician and the Pope
acknowledged that a problem was beyond them is perhaps as good a time as any to take as the
beginning of the modern biomedical ethics movement.” See also Brief for New Jersey Catholic
Conference as Amicus Curiae, Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (No. A-116), in 2 IN THE MATTER OF
KAREN QUINLAN: THE COMPLETE BRIEFS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, AND OPINION IN THE NEW
JERSEY SUPREME COURT 197 (1976) (supporting the Quinlan family’s decision to withdraw
treatment).
45. See BURT, supra note 27, at 67–70 (discussing the case law that dismantled physician
authority and noting that the case law reflected changing social attitudes toward physicians); see
also Sandra H. Johnson, Quinlan and Cruzan: Beyond the Symbols, in HEALTH LAW AND
BIOETHICS, supra note 37, at 53, 68 (discussing the Quinlan decision in light of the negative
reactions it elicited from various members of the medical community).
46. See, e.g., M.L. Tina Stevens, The Quinlan Case Revisited: A History of the Cultural
Politics of Medicine and the Law, 21 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 347, 362–63 (1996).
47. See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, I’ve Seen Enough! My Life and Times in Health Care Law
and Policy, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 107 (2004) (regarding health care antitrust law); Carl E.
Schneider, After Autonomy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 411 (2006) (regarding bioethics). Reform
of the physician-patient relationship occurred contemporaneously with the broader civil rights
movements that emphasized individual rights. Paul Starr observed that “[m]edical care figured
prominently in this generalization of rights, particularly as a concern of the women’s movement
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The reform aspect of health law is especially pronounced in the context of
bioethics. Many histories of bioethics, in fact, attribute its origins to legal
interventions. For some, the Quinlan case gave birth to the field.48 Others
identify the Nuremberg Trials concerning the Nazi experiments as the
beginning of bioethics,49 and still others, the events that set the stage for the
familiar scandal-reform call and response common in health care regulation
generally.50
The building blocks of bioethics bear law’s imprint—the emphasis on
individual rights, the primacy of autonomy, and the default to procedure and
evidentiary rules rather than substance for the resolution of conflict.51 Legal
tools became the instruments both of radical change and of moderation in
bioethics.52 This is not to say that law was the only player in the generation of
bioethics, but law was at the table in even the earliest efforts.53

and in the new movements specifically for patients’ rights and for the rights of the handicapped,
the mentally ill, the retarded, and the subjects of medical research.” PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 388–89 (1982). Others note the current effect of
increased commercialization, the emergence of evidence-based medicine in response to variations
in medical practice, and the expanded management prerogatives stimulated by financing changes.
See, e.g., BOSK, supra note 26, at xiv; Bloche, supra note 31, at 1108–09; Dolgin, supra note 31,
at 712–14.
48. Albert R. Jonsen, The Birth of Bioethics, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.–Dec. 1993, at
S1, S3 (identifying the Quinlan case, revelations of abuse in medical research, and the allocation
of dialysis machines by a citizen committee in Seattle as potential birthdates for the field).
49. See, e.g., BURT, supra note 27, at 80 (stating that the influence of the Nuremberg Code is
the key to understanding the current emphasis on the “self-determination principle” in medical
treatment contexts).
50. See Arthur L. Caplan, What Bioethics Brought to the Public, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Nov.–Dec. 1993, at S14, S14 (noting that the media was attracted to covering bioethics issues
because they arose in scandals).
51. “Law sides with patients to oppose the arbitrary use of power whether by physicians or
the government; the rubric is patient rights. This is why American law, not philosophy or
medicine, is primarily responsible for the agenda, development and current state of American
bioethics.” GEORGE J. ANNAS, STANDARD OF CARE: THE LAW OF AMERICAN BIOETHICS 3
(1993). But see Daniel Callahan, Why America Accepted Bioethics, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Nov.–Dec. 1993, at S8, S8 (identifying American liberalism as the source of bioethics’ emphasis
on patients’ rights); Robert M. Veatch, From Forgoing Life Support to Aid-in-Dying, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Nov.–Dec. 1993, at S7, S7 (attributing the emphasis to the social movements of the
1960s).
52. Callahan, supra note 51, at S8, notes that bioethics took a middle course between
extreme positions: “That middle course is regulation . . . . On the one hand you avoid the
extremes of simple prohibition of things, while on the other hand you show that you are serious
and willing to be cautious.”
53. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF HOW LAW AND
BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING 3–4 (1991) (identifying bioethics as an
interdisciplinary effort); K. Danner Clouser, Bioethics and Philosophy, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Nov.–Dec. 1993, at S10, S10.
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Recommendations emerging from the works of the first multidisciplinary
groups to approach bioethics problems were rather quickly translated into legal
standards.54 The influence of the law in developing this new field as
something distinct from “medical ethics” is undeniable.55
The reform agenda of health law does not stop at bioethics. Change in the
law applicable to physicians’ financial and business dealings intended, in part,
to deter collusion and cartel behavior among doctors and to realign their
financial interests to better serve those of the payment systems and efficiency
concerns.56 Changing the legal environment for physicians’ financial
relationships, including extending the restrictions of antitrust law to the
medical profession, was a “revolutionary cause,”57 intended to encourage
doctors to change their behaviors—to be more entrepreneurial, to be more
market-oriented than tradition allowed, but not too much so.58 Regulation of
physicians’ behavior to strike the appropriate balance between the ideal of a
free market and the reality of market failure—for example in the context of
billing, payment to medical researchers, joint ventures, or receipt of financial
support from vendors—represents a significant reform movement as well.59
54. See, e.g., The Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the
Definition of Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 JAMA 85 (1968) [hereinafter
Ad Hoc Committee] (defining determination of death). See generally In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d
647, 656 (N.J. 1976) (accepting the Ad Hoc Committee’s standards); Eun-Kyoung Choi et al.,
Brain Death Revisited: The Case for a National Standard, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 824, 825
(2008) (recounting that state legislatures began to write the concept of brain death into law
following the Ad Hoc Committee’s report).
55. Callahan, supra note 51, at S8 (“[R]egulation [is] the way we in the United States
typically deal with controversial issues.”); Veatch, supra note 51, at S7 (“The development of
rights approaches is totally alien to the traditional Hippocratic medical ethics.”). But see Roger
B. Dworkin, Bioethics? The Law and Biomedical Advance, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 43, 44 (2004),
for the argument that “lawyers have nothing special to say about any of these [bioethics] matters”
and that philosophy is “best equipped to evaluate bio-social questions.”
56. See, e.g., Greaney, supra note 41, at 189–90; Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of
Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431,
532–33 (1988).
57. Havighurst, supra note 47, at 118 (describing the developments that shifted legal norms
away from professional control and toward the market, including the extension of antitrust laws
to health care); see also James F. Blumstein, Health Care Reform and Competing Visions of
Medical Care: Antitrust and State Provider Cooperation Legislation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1459
(1994) (arguing that application to, and enforcement of antitrust principles in the U.S. health care
market have driven a paradigm shift).
58. See, e.g., James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Redefining Government’s Role in
Health Care: Is a Dose of Competition What the Doctor Should Order?, 34 VAND. L. REV. 849,
924–26 (1981) (concluding that neither competition nor regulation alone provides an adequate
and appropriate tool for controlling physician behavior and that the choice between regulatory
and market approaches needs to be made on other than an abstract level).
59. Concerns about market-responsive behaviors, such as self-referrals and conflicts of
interest, illustrate the continuing discomfort with market models for medical practice. See
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Reform and Professionalism

According to health law and policy scholars,60 Paul Starr’s Pulitzer-prizewinning book, The Social Transformation of American Medicine,61 is one of
the most influential texts ever written about the medical profession and the
health care system. Its effect on legal scholarship is impressive: as of 2003, it
had been cited more than 1400 times in 433 law review articles.62 In addition,
Starr’s book appealed across ideological lines as it “redefined how lawyers
think about medicine”; 63 providing support to those who sought to strengthen
market forces as well as to those who sought to enhance justice concerns.64
In his book, Paul Starr narrates the history of medicine through a lens that
deconstructs the notion of profession, demonstrating that the medical

generally MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS’ CONFLICTS OF
INTERST (1993) (discussing physicians’ conflicts of interest and the incentives that cause them to
increase or decrease services); Dolgin, supra note 31 (contrasting attitudes of physicians
regarding the parameters of medicine as related to market incentives provided by the
pharmaceutical industry); Benjamin P. Falit, Ancillary Service and Self-Referral Arrangements in
the Medical and Legal Professions: Do Current Ethical, Legislative, and Regulatory Policies
Adequately Serve the Interests of Patients and Clients?, 58 S.C. L. REV. 371 (2006) (comparing
self-referral regulations pertaining to doctors and lawyers respectively); William M. Sage, Some
Principles Require Principals: Why Banning “Conflicts of Interest” Won’t Solve Incentive
Problems in Biomedical Research, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1413 (2007) (addressing regulation of
financial relationships in the field of medical research).
60. See Special Issue, Transforming American Medicine: A Twenty-Year Retrospective on
The Social Transformation of American Medicine, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 557 (2004). In
addition to the Pulitzer Prize, Starr’s book won several prizes from academic and professional
organizations, including the American College of Healthcare Executives, and was reviewed on
the front page of the New York Times. Joel D. Howell, What the Doctors Read, 29 J. HEALTH
POL. POL’Y & L. 781, 781–82 (2004).
61. STARR, supra note 47.
62. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Uses of The Social Transformation of American Medicine:
The Case of Law, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 799, 799 (2004). Jost observes that the effect of
the book on health law as a practice, rather than as a field of study, is less clear, id. at 809,
although it seems to have been especially influential in the application of antitrust law to the
profession, id. at 811. See also Howell, supra note 60, at 783 n.3 (noting that the Science
Citation Index reported over 2000 citations to the book as of July 2003).
63. Jost, supra note 62, at 808 (quoting Sara Rosenbaum during an interview with Jost)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
64. Jost notes that “[l]egal scholars from a wide range of perspectives found in the book an
elegant, accessible, and comprehensive history of physician dominance of health care, which
supported their own vision of how the health care system had to change.” Id. at 807. The book
was viewed by free market advocates as refuting the view that professional power was a response
to market failure, contra Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical
Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV, 941 passim (1963), rather than conscious and deliberate self-serving
behavior; while it was viewed by the “left wing in health law scholarship” as providing an
important framework for thinking about diverse problems of justice and rights, Jost, supra note
62, at 808.
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profession quite frequently—or perhaps inherently—advocates for its own
self-interest in the guise of concerns over quality and with a claim of special
expertise and professional virtue.65 The debunking of the myth of the
profession by Starr and others66 laid the intellectual groundwork for the
rejection of deference to professional self-regulation and self-governance.
Medicine’s claims of altruism and special expertise as the best guardians of
patient welfare have been used to justify paternalism in the physician-patient
relationship and to insulate medicine from the discipline of the market.67 As
this paternalism and insulation were peeled away, the deference traditionally
accorded to the profession and its views of its right relationship to law were
removed as well.68 This new understanding—that the traditional deference
accorded the profession had been manipulated to subject law to its service—
certainly influenced how reformers heard physicians’ claims that the new legal
order for medicine harmed rather than helped patients.69 Rather than the deep

65. STARR, supra note 47, at 15–16. Although a key event in intellectual history, Starr’s
book reflected social movements of its time in attacking professional hegemony, just as the
ascendancy of physician dominance was supported by social movements of its era. See Bernice
A. Pescosolido & Jack K. Martin, Cultural Authority and the Sovereignty of American Medicine:
The Role of Networks, Class, and Community, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 735, 737–38
(2004) (distinguishing physician dominance and physician sovereignty in light of Starr’s book).
Starr also recognizes the role of social movements in establishing and maintaining the status
(whether high or low) of the medical profession over time. STARR, supra note 47, at 144.
66. See, e.g., ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF
MEDICAL CARE, at xi (1970); MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM, at
xi–xviii (1977); Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 9–
10 (1976). Starr acknowledges that the view of medicine as a cartel was expressed in much of the
literature of the time. STARR, supra note 47, at 15–17. In fact, the Supreme Court’s 1975
decision applying antitrust law to the legal profession made a significant contribution to
dismantling the legal deference traditionally accorded the “learned professions.” Goldfarb v. Va.
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975).
67. William M. Sage, Relational Duties, Regulatory Duties, and the Widening Gap Between
Individual Health Law and Collective Health Policy, 96 GEO. L.J. 497, 498–99 (2008)
(“Professional (that is, physician) control over health care has a long, checkered history of both
public-mindedness and protectionism.”).
68. See Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Four Ages of Health Law, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 155, 155–
56 (2004) (discussing the movement from deference to the profession, through “modestly
egalitarian” models, and finally to reliance on market forces).
69. See, e.g., David A. Hyman, When and Why Lawyers Are the Problem, 57 DEPAUL L.
REV. 267, 268–69 (2008) (“[O]ne should view complaints by professionals about how
competition will adversely affect consumers with considerable skepticism, because self-interest
has a distinct tendency to skew such assessments.”). Hyman notes that innovations in health care
delivery attract “a heated response from the usual suspects making the usual arguments.” Id. at
271. Hyman compares medicine and law, finding similar self-interest, although noting that the
legal profession has been more successful in protecting itself. Id. at 268; see also Clark C.
Havighurst & Nancy M. P. King, Private Credentialing of Health Care Personnel: An Antitrust
Perspective (pt. 2), 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 263, 291–92 (1983) (“Under the banners of ‘medical
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insights of a venerable profession, such claims came to be viewed as the work
of a self-serving guild that sought to protect itself.70 A great range of
complaints—that informed consent was unworkable; that living wills were
impractical; that licensure boards for medicine and for other health professions
had to be controlled by doctors; that cost controls would dangerously confine
treatment decisionmaking—could each be interpreted through the “self-serving
guild” narrative in which medicine struggles to maintain physician control of
treatment decisions through paternalism in the physician-patient relationship
and through exemption from the workings of competitive markets. These
claims could then be marginalized as merely self-interested and dismissed as
an effort to grasp at the remnants of the gilded age of professional hegemony
wherever possible.71
Public regulation of physicians did not operate from a notion that all
doctors were bad or that all medicine was bad, of course. In fact, regulation
generally justifies and orients itself around the few bad apples model of the
profession.72 Its rules and enforcement efforts are targeted at finding,
punishing, and deterring bad behavior on the part of a minority of the
physician population.73 This model, too, influences how physician complaints
about legal requirements are heard. With the few bad apples in mind,

science,’ ‘quality of care,’ and ‘professional prerogative,’ the medical profession was able to
repel most attacks along its borders . . . .”). Kenneth J. Arrow offers an opposing view of the
significance of claims of professionalism in light of market failure in his classic article,
Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, supra note 64. Arrow argues that
professionalism overcomes market failures in the medical context and thus, its claims are socially
beneficial. See id. at 947, 967. Arrow’s analysis of market failure has had significant influence
on health policy, “eclipsing in influence [his] case for the social welfare benefits of
anticompetitive professional norms.” Bloche, supra note 31, at 1104.
70. See, for example, Bloche, supra note 31, at 1099–1100, for the argument that the “guild
ideology,” as constructed by Richard Posner and others, understands claims of professionalism as
serving the self-interest of guild members and “deceiv[ing] both its own adherents and the public
concerning members’ furtherance of their own interests at society’s expense” and thus, does not
deserve “law’s deference.” See also Harold C. Sox, Editorial, Medical Professionalism and the
Parable of the Craft Guilds, 147 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 809 (2007) (using the illustration of
medieval guilds to explain medicine’s current subjection to government control).
71. Regulatory collusion in the effort to retain status and power is recognized in critiques of
administrative agency behavior based on regulatory capture. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Living
Dangerously: A Defense of Mortal Peril, U. ILL. L. REV. 909, 927–28 (1998).
72. See, e.g., BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 34, at 65–66 (discussing the extension of the
“bad apple” metaphor in health and occupational safety regulation); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost,
Oversight of the Quality of Medical Care: Regulation, Management, or the Market?, 37 ARIZ. L.
REV. 825, 839 (1995).
73. See BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 34, at 65 (arguing that the proportion of bad apples
in most regulatory programs is overestimated despite suggestions to the contrary from
commentators and from demonstrated regulatory practice).
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resistance to efforts to punish and deter bad behavior can easily be interpreted
as the squealing of these outliers or their empathetic allies.
Dismissing “bad law” claims out of hand blocks efforts to seriously assess
The
the operation and impact of the regulatory system at issue.74
deconstruction of the traditional notions of professionalism and the
construction of the guild and the few bad apples archetypes created a bias in
the way that doctors’ “bad law” claims often have been received. This
selective hearing impedes the learning that closer examination of physician
reports of defective legal standards and controls can yield.75 Furthermore,
deference to medicine’s professionalism claims is not entirely extinct,76 and
dependency on medicine’s superior knowledge can afford doctors’ “bad law”
claims disproportionate authority. Neither dismissiveness nor oversensitivity
to doctors’ claims well serves efforts to reform physician behavior toward
building a better health care system or providing better care to patients.
C. Consequences as an Inadequate Basis for Evaluating Reform
Concerning oneself with physicians’ “bad law” claims gives priority to the
consequences of the law in relation to physician behavior.77 The assertion that
the product of law reform should be evaluated based on its consequences does
not go unchallenged, however. Measuring legal standards solely by their effect
gives an inadequate accounting of the purposes of law. The symbolic and

74. See, e.g., Jesse A. Goldner, The Unending Saga of Legal Controls over Scientific
Misconduct: A Clash of Cultures Needing Resolution, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 293, 343 (1998) (“The
historical tendency in science to view research misconduct as aberrational has undoubtedly
contributed to the lack of attention paid to the very real problems that often result from both true
and untrue charges.”).
75. See, e.g., Thomas L. Greaney, Chicago’s Procrustean Bed: Applying Antitrust Law in
Health Care, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 857, 858 (2004) (urging “courts and enforcers to pause” before
applying rules to the health care marketplace).
76. See, e.g., Eric G. Campbell et al., Professionalism in Medicine: Results of a National
Survey of Physicians, 147 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 795, 795–96 (2007) (surveying physicians on
the meaning of professionalism, and noting adoption of professionalism claims on the part of
national medical organizations); Fred Hafferty, Finding Soul in a “Medical Profession of One,”
28 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 133, 136
(2003) (reviewing ELIOT FREIDSON,
PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC (2001)) (“[O]rganized medicine has sought respite and
redemption [from contemporary challenges] by embracing the ideology of professionalism with
an almost religious fervor.”); Clark C. Havighurst, How the Health Care Revolution Fell Short,
65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 72–73 (2002); Rosenblatt, supra note 68, at 156.
77. The concern about the consequences of law originated with legal realism, predating and
giving rise to theories of law and social norms, law and economics, critical legal studies, and
more recently, cognitive theory and law. See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Justice of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, The Path of the Law, Address Delivered at the
Dedication of the New Hall of the Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 110 HARV.
L. REV. 991, 1001 (1997) (arguing that the law should be designed so that its actual effects take
precedence over arguments based solely on morality or history or philosophy).
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normative effect of law, for example, is significant even if it has little or no
effect on behavior.78
Legal norms in health care, in fact, quite explicitly rest on religious and
ethical principles. The opinion in Quinlan, for example, relied extensively on
Catholic moral theology.79 Federal regulation of research rests on the
normative framework of the Belmont Report.80 Arguments about physician
payment regulation often speak in terms of physicians’ moral or ethical duties
to their patients.81
The influence of the normative content and purpose of law may be one
reason that there is such a dearth of empirical research on the effect of law on
physician behavior.82 In some areas of health law, for example in the legal
requirement of informed consent83 or the implementation of living wills and
78. See generally Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social
Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603 (2000) (exploring the effect of law on social norms).
79. The opinion in Quinlan incorporates nearly the complete amicus brief filed by the
conference of bishops of New Jersey. For a discussion of the role of Catholic thought in this
case, see Johnson, supra note 45, at 66–68.
80. NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR
THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (1979), available at http://www.nih
training.com/ohsrsite/guidelines/belmont.html. For the report’s impact on federal regulations, see
CARL H. COLEMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN
SUBJECTS 52–56 (2005).
81. See, e.g., Ron Roizen, Why I Oppose Drug Company Payment of Physician/Investigators
on a Per Patient/Subject Basis, IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES., Jan.–Feb. 1988, at 9 (questioning
whether “percapita physician payment [is] ethical” and criticizing some physicians’ “self-serving
deception” of patients).
82. See Sandra H. Johnson, End-of-Life Decision Making: What We Don’t Know, We Make
Up; What We Do Know, We Ignore, 31 IND. L. REV. 13, 36 (1998) (discussing the tension
between the norm-setting function of law and the demands that standards rest on substantial
voluntary compliance); Mello et al., supra note 32, at 398–99 (attributing the lack of empirical
research on cost-effectiveness of health care regulation to continuing deference to ethical norms).
Another significant barrier to basing regulatory design on empirical research is the difficulty of
designing effective and valid studies. Compare William M. Sage, Judicial Opinions Involving
Health Insurance Coverage: Trompe L’Oeil or Window on the World?, 31 IND. L. REV. 49 (1998)
(arguing that current empirical research on judicial decisions is useless when it does not indicate
whether or not the health insurance system is accomplishing public policy goals), with Karen A.
Jordan, Empirical Studies of Judicial Decisions Serve an Important Role in the Cumulative
Process of Policy Making: Comments on a Paper by Professor William Sage, 31 IND. L. REV. 81,
87–88 (2008) (arguing that empirical studies of judicial decisions can play a more important role
than Sage suggests), and Maxwell J. Mehlman, Getting a Handle on Coverage Decisions: If Not
Case Law, Then What?: Comments on a Paper by Professor William Sage, 31 IND. L. REV. 75
(2008) (agreeing that “case law is a poor source of empirical data” but disagreeing with Sage that
other good sources of data exist). See generally Mello & Zeiler, supra note 33, at 662–66
(identifying “significant methodological challenges” to empirical health law studies).
83. Evidence concerning informed consent indicates that neither patients nor doctors are up
to the task, both in terms of desire and capacity. See Schneider, supra note 47, at 414.
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patient determination of care at the end of life,84 we have significant evidence
that the legal norm has been less than effective, at least in the way in which it
was intended to work.85 We are unlikely to abandon informed consent as a
requirement for treatment or patient choice as the touchstone for end-of-life
care. The evidence of the failings of this norm just does not matter. This
commitment evidences true belief both in the moral content of these legal
standards specifically, and in the normative character of law generally.86 An
appreciation for the expressive power of law itself supports an inclination to
maintain aspirational norms.87
Commitment to the normative content of such laws also breeds optimism
that the gap between the ideal and the reality can be fixed using the force of
law and supplementary levers, applied to physicians over enough time.
Furthermore, if resistance is interpreted as a strategy in a battle over
professional power or if these complaints are attributed to bad apples in the
profession, they will be discounted. These expectations lead critics to dismiss
the possibility that professional resistance is a serious substantive critique of
the design or function of the law.88 Both the normatic aspirations of law
reform and low expectations for doctors’ responsiveness to reforms contribute
to the rejection of “bad law” claims.

84. “[T]he facts are that applying the autonomy framework in end of life decision-making
has had little practical effect and much fictitious posturing. Efforts to persuade people to create
and implement advance directives to protect their autonomy if they should become incompetent
have essentially failed.” Robert A. Burt, The End of Autonomy, HASTINGS CENTER REP.
(SPECIAL REP.), Nov.–Dec. 2005, at S9, S9.
85. Comparing the nature of the physician-patient relationship as it existed in the 1950s as
compared to the twenty-first century, however, it is difficult to say that the patient’s position in
the relationship has not changed considerably and that perhaps some of this change was produced
by legal recognition of informed consent, at least as a normative principle or public policy. See
supra text accompanying notes 36–46. On the other hand, the demise of the paternalistic model
and the rise of the more egalitarian model may be more attributable to increasing
commercialization in medicine rather than the informed consent norm. Dolgin, supra note 31, at
712–15.
86. Johnson, supra note 82, at 36.
87. Robert Gatter, Faith, Confidence, and Health Care: Fostering Trust in Medicine
Through Law, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 395, 438–45 (2004) (arguing that the law can be used as
a powerful tool for increasing consumer confidence in health care).
88. Of course, some of the defense of legal standards, despite evidence of their
ineffectiveness in achieving stated goals, may reflect self-interest on the part of the legal
profession. See, for example, Havighurst, supra note 47, at 122, noting “the power of the rightsbased legal paradigm and of the trial lawyers who defend [medical malpractice law]” for their
own benefit.
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II. “BAD LAW” CLAIMS
Not all “bad law” claims are the same. Some are dishonest or strategic.
Some result from misunderstanding or misinformation about the particular
legal standard at issue. Once dishonesty and confusion are ruled out, however,
the remaining claims should be considered to be valid even if an examination
of formal standards and processes do not confirm them to be so. Some
complaints about bad law refer not to formal legal requirements but rather to
shadow systems that confound the intent and purpose of the formal legal
requirements. Doctors may be pointing at requirements that are adopted and
enforced by private organizations, for example, or they may be identifying
informal penalties imposed by processes through which the law is enforced by
government agencies. Finally, some “bad law” claims reveal that legal
standards do, in fact, require bad medicine and harm, rather than improve,
health care access, efficiency, or quality.
This Part discusses each of these categories of “bad law” claims. It begins
with a brief discussion of dishonest claims.89 It then addresses claims that
arise from misunderstanding, and demonstrates how physicians’ learning
patterns breed misinformation about the law.90 The discussion then focuses on
two instances in which “bad law” claims are valid even though an examination
of formal legal requirements and procedures do not support their assertion.
Although distinct, each of these two instances reflects the operation of shadow
systems or rogue standards that are not evident in the formal legal regime.91
Finally, this section concludes with a brief discussion of situations in which the
formal legal standard is, in fact, wrong.92
The taxonomy offered here93 is not intended to be comprehensive.94 In
addition, “bad law” claims in specific contexts may actually overlap and fall
within more than one of the categories. Finally, physician behavior responds
to environmental influences other than law or fear of legal entanglement,
including social, ethical, financial, and administrative pressures.95 This

89. See discussion infra Part II.A.
90. See discussion infra Part II.B.
91. See discussion infra Part II.C–D.
92. See discussion infra Part II.E.
93. See Sandra H. Johnson, Managed Care as Regulation: Functional Ethics for a Regulated
Environment, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 266 (1995) (using an early version of this analytical
framework to analyze physicians’ reactions to managed care restrictions).
94. For example, some physician “bad law” claims may result from a sort of free-floating
anxiety or distrust. See, e.g., David L. Ralston, Pain Management: Texas Legislative and
Regulatory Update, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 328, 330 (1996) (reporting on a survey of Texas
physicians in which 68% believed that the medical board’s policy influenced pain treatment, but
61% reported that they did not know the board’s standards for opioid prescribing).
95. See, e.g., BOSK, supra note 26, passim (addressing the influence of social norms and
social networks on physician accountability); Sandra H. Johnson, The Social, Professional, and
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taxonomy addresses only claims relating to law, although the influence of
other environmental factors is accounted for indirectly.96
A.

Dishonest: Scapegoating the Law

Dishonest “bad law” claims disguise motivations that relate solely to the
provider’s own interests. A doctor, for example, may find it easier to tell a
patient that the law does not allow her to prescribe particular medications
rather than explaining that the doctor has concerns about the patient’s living
arrangements or use of alcohol or marijuana; that the doctor thinks the patient
is manipulative or weak and whiny; or that the doctor is concerned about his or
her reputation as easily duped or incompetent for providing this treatment to
this particular patient.97
Blaming the law is a particularly powerful source of control because it
diverts attention from the real decisionmaker (the physician) and from the true
reason for the denial of care (worries about the patient’s characteristics or
social network concerns). It does so in a fashion that creates an assumption of
both good will and powerlessness on the part of the patient’s dear doctor.98
Legal Framework for the Problem of Pain Management in Emergency Medicine, 33 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 741 (2005) (describing ethical and social influences in emergency medicine).
96. See, e.g., discussion infra Part III.
97. These are common concerns expressed by doctors treating chronic pain patients. See
Ann M. Martino, In Search of a New Ethic for Treating Patients with Chronic Pain: What Can
Medical Boards Do?, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 332, 334, 336–41 (1998).
98. “Bad law” claims may also be strategic in a larger sense to forge coalitions to support
change in legal standards. Legislatures apparently have been influenced by claims that doctors
would not provide emergency care for fear of liability, James Fehlberg, Note, Physicians—Civil
Liability for Treatment Rendered at the Scene of an Emergency, 1964 WIS. L. REV. 494, 497 n.20
(1964); would not treat Medicare patients if rates were reduced, William Blanchet & Wayne
Phillips, Health Care and the Election, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA, Oct. 2, 2008, at A (arguing
that Medicare fee reductions blocked by Democrats in Congress would have “forced most of the
few remaining private Medicare providers to resign”); Mike King, Editorial, Medicare Fix Only
Delays Inevitable: Halting Pay Cuts to Doctors Was a Start, but a Healthy Debate Awaits Down
the Road, ATLANTA J. CONST., July 27, 2008, at B6 (“The battle [over reduction of Medicare
physician fees] pitted doctors against insurance companies, and because of their relationships
with patients (read: voters), doctors always have more political clout than insurance
companies.”); Am. Health Line, Am. Political Network, AHL Highlights Recent Efforts by
Republicans, July 30, 2008, available at WESTLAW, 7/30/2008 APN-HE 8 (reporting that
Republicans were trying to mend their relationship with “once-loyal allies” in the medical
profession after supporting a reduction in Medicare fees which ultimately was blocked by
Democrats); would have to endanger mothers and newborns through early discharge if “drivethrough deliveries” were not outlawed, William H. Dow et al., Differential Effectiveness in
Patient Protection Laws: What Are the Causes?: An Example from the Drive-Through Delivery
Laws, 31 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1107, 1107–08 (2006) (noting such statutes were part of the
“backlash” against managed care); David A. Hyman, Drive-Through Deliveries: Is “Consumer
Protection” Just What the Doctor Ordered?, 78 N.C. L. REV. 5, 89 (1999); or would not continue
to deliver babies if malpractice litigation were not reined in, Douglas A. Kysar et al., Medical
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Misinformed: I Heard It Through the Grapevine

The doctor may be wrong about what the law requires or prohibits, yet the
doctor’s understanding of the law is honestly asserted. Non-expert individuals
dealing with an extensive body of rules that govern their actions on a daily
basis do not ordinarily seek legal counsel and instead rely substantially on
informal, word-of-mouth sources. At a very early point, the time and expense
required to secure a more authoritative description of the law simply makes the
effort impractical and unbearable. Any rule-oriented system, in which the
specific rules are not easily accessible to those bound by them, will experience
a similar informal, underground communication network.
In their clinical decisionmaking, physicians are more likely to turn to
physician colleagues for advice rather than referring to journal articles or other
decision supports.99 This same pattern may operate in their seeking advice as
to the legal requirements for their practice, crowding out counsel from persons
with more legal expertise. Intuitively as well, one has to believe that doctors
trust other doctors more than they do lawyers.100
Doctors value clinical experience rather than rules and guidelines in
treatment decisionmaking.101 This heuristic may operate in the context of
assessing legal risk and developing responsive behaviors as well. Thus, the
stories told by doctors about their own or others’ experiences with the law take
on even more power in part because they fit the learning and evidencegathering patterns generally familiar in medicine.102 In addition, stories told
within physician groups are likely to amplify extremes in terms of the rendition
of the facts of the case, as well as the view that the system is offensive and
unfair.103

Malpractice Myths and Realities: Why an Insurance Crisis Is Not a Lawsuit Crisis, 39 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 785, 812–13 (2006) (analyzing and refuting claims that malpractice premiums were
causing “provider flight” among obstetricians); Michelle M. Mello et al., Policy Experimentation
with Administrative Compensation for Medical Injury: Issues Under State Constitutional Law, 45
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 59, 60–61 (2008) (describing sources of pressure for malpractice reform).
See also, for example, Hyman, supra note 69, at 272, referring to doctors’ “mobilization of
pliable state agencies to do the dirty work.” Hyman levies similar charges against the legal
profession. Id. at 273. Such politically strategic claims may fall within any of the categories
discussed in this paper.
99. Johnson, supra note 30, at 76.
100. See supra note 27.
101. See Johnson, supra note 30, at 74–76.
102. See, e.g., BOSK, supra note 26, at 86–87, 104 (describing the powerful impact of the
single experience and the “horror stories” shared among physicians as a part of physician
learning).
103. See, e.g., Molly J. Walker Wilson, A Behavioral Critique of Command-and-Control
Environmental Regulation, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 223, 240–42 (2005) (discussing group
polarity in a regulatory setting).
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When the rule is miscommunicated, it will have an impact quite different
from that intended, possibly to the disadvantage of the patient, the doctor, and
the public. Legal standards applicable to medical practice tend to be complex
or fact-sensitive and, thus, are particularly resistant to accurate mouth-tomouth-to-mouth communication on the grapevine.
Yet, this informal
communication network is the source of choice for physicians for much of
their information and learning about legal requirements that affect their
practice.
C. From the Shadows: Whose Rule Is This Anyway?
A doctor may honestly and sincerely charge that the “law” restricts good
care and may accurately understand the “rule,” but may be pointing the finger
at the wrong target. In fact, someone else’s rule, and not the law, may be the
problem. Health care organizations all have their own informal and formal
structures that establish standards and procedures internal to the
organization.104 Common illustrations of these efforts include the work of the
hospital risk manager;105 the efforts of compliance officers who set
requirements for billing, and thus, for physician work;106 policies and
consultations provided by the ethics committee;107 the hospital’s
pharmaceuticals and therapeutics committee that determines whether specific
drugs will be available for prescribing;108 the credentialing process that
increasingly monitors physicians’ practice patterns, patient outcomes, and
personal behavior;109 the hospital’s quality management and patient
satisfaction programs that set and enforce expectations for responding

104. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,
594–625 (2000) (discussing how Medicare and Medicaid operate in private organizations, such as
nursing homes). This analysis would also apply to the influence of the Joint Commission on the
operation of hospitals and physician practices within those institutions. See id. at 610–15
(discussing how the Joint Commission enacts standards in tandem with the Health Care Financing
Administration).
105. See Mello et al., supra note 32, at 409 (discussing the role of the hospital risk manager
when he or she learns that an adverse event has occurred).
106. See D. Scott Jones & Paul N. Bind, Jr., Are Compliance Officers Leading the Way When
It Comes to Quality?, J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE, Sept.–Oct. 2008, at 43, 47 (discussing the
work of compliance officers in the context of billing).
107. Giles R. Scofield, What Is Medical Ethics Consultation?, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 95, 95
(2008) (describing the role and significance of ethics consultation).
108. Am. Soc’y of Hosp. Pharmacists, ASHP Statement on the Pharmacy and Therapeutics
Committee and Formulary System, 49 AM. J. HOSP. PHARMACY 648 (1992).
109. See Joint Commission, Behaviors that Undermine a Culture of Safety, SENTINEL EVENT
ALERT, July 9, 2008, available at http://www.jointcommission.org/SentinelEvents/Sentinel
EventAlert/sea_40.htm; Eleanor D. Kinney, Hospital Peer Review of Physicians: Does Statutory
Immunity Increase Risk of Unwarranted Professional Injury?, 13 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 57
(2009).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

996

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:973

positively to patients’ and families’ requests regarding medical care;110 and so
on. In this environment, it is quite possible that the law the doctor identifies as
requiring inappropriate care is the organization’s policy, rule, or procedure and
not any formal legal requirement. In fact, the influence of law in medicine can
be crowded out by these private organizational forces that have more direct
contact with the physician’s day-to-day work.111
The internal structures that influence, direct, or control physician behavior
in health care, now frequently referred to as “new governance,”112 are
pervasive. These private players operate on a parallel track or in partnership
with legal regulatory efforts113 and are often hailed as a supplement to the
public enforcement of legal norms. The organization’s rule, however, may
differ from the law.
Organizational policies, for example, are likely to be designed to put some
distance between the organization and legal risk,114 avoiding conflicts that may
or may not bloom into legal issues.115 One might think that if observance of
legal standards is a good thing, then being especially observant must be just as
good if not better. It is not. Just as the Sunday drivers cruising ten miles
below the speed limit on a major thoroughfare actually become a safety hazard,
rules that aim at bringing medical practice well within legal boundaries may be
hazardous to patients. Organizational policies that influence doctors toward
behaving more cautiously may restrict health care access for particular patient
populations (those viewed as likely to be difficult or to raise risks of adverse
outcomes or oversight). They may restrict treatments or medications (with

110. See MICHAEL E. MILAKOVICH, IMPROVING SERVICE QUALITY 193–97 (1995).
111. See generally Carol A. Heimer, Competing Institutions: Law, Medicine, and Family in
Neonatal Intensive Care, 33 L. & SOC’Y REV. 17, 49–50 (1999) (arguing that unless those who
monitor day-to-day activities of hospitals translate the law into hospital routines, its effect “is
much more muted”).
112. See Louise G. Trubek, New Governance and Soft Law in Health Care Reform, 3 IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 139 (2006); See also Scott Burris et al., Changes in Governance: A CrossDisciplinary Review of Current Scholarship, 41 AKRON L. REV. 1 (2008) (providing an in-depth
analysis of governance applying to health care as well as other contexts).
113. See generally Peter D. Jacobson, Regulating Health Care: From Self-Regulation to SelfRegulation, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1165, 1171–73 (2001); Jost, supra note 72, at 827–41
(providing a history of the concurrent development of public and private regulatory efforts).
114. “When the regulated organization cannot determine with a high degree of confidence
what is required for compliance with a new regulation, several special costs are incurred. If the
organization is risk averse or the penalty for noncompliance is high, organizations may
overcomply.” Mello et al., supra note 32, at 401–02.
115. The hospital’s lawyers are likely to have provided legal counsel for these efforts. Actual
legal standards may allow the organization more flexibility than the organization or counsel
chooses to allow in the organization’s policies. See discussion infra Part III. See also Sandra H.
Johnson & Jesse A. Goldner, Hospitals Broaden Role of In-House Counsel, HEALTH PROGRESS,
May 1987, at 68 (arguing that hospitals should press counsel on advice concerning legal risk).
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doctors avoiding those that require pre-approval or the hospital eliminating
those with black-box warnings).116 They may encourage doctors to provide
unnecessary care or testing (that which the patient or family demands prior to
completing the patient satisfaction survey).117
The context of end-of-life care provides a useful parallel and illustrates the
significance of the concept of “over-observance” of the law.
Reconceptualizing continued medical interventions to delay dying as
“overtreatment” and as much an error as “undertreatment” produced a new
way of thinking about choices concerning medical treatment at the end of life.
When continued ventilator support, for example, was considered as merely
maintaining the status quo and not as a “decision,” only discontinuation of
ventilator support required that a decision be made. Only when continued
ventilator support was reframed as active treatment, and in fact as
overtreatment, did a substantial choice between two equal and competing
options present itself where none had existed before.118 So, too, an
understanding of the costs of “overobservance” of law provides a tool for
assessing the impact of private organizational activity designed to avoid legal
risk.119
Coordination between public enforcement and private regimes can be
mutually reinforcing in protecting patients. “Double enforcement,” however,
can put the public regulatory system out of balance and distort the intended
relationship between penalty and offense. For example, a physician and the
state medical board may agree to resolve an inquiry as to the physician’s
prescribing practices, without proof of actual violation of standards, by having
the doctor enroll in a continuing medical education (CME) program. This may
be viewed as a very light penalty, if a penalty at all, by the medical board and
quite appropriate in light of the nature of the board’s inquiry. On the doctor’s
part, the agreement to participate in CME may be a rational and practical
compromise of the dispute over particular practices with the board and one that
would take the “death penalty” of license revocation off the table.120

116. Heart-to-Heart Radio Series Program I: Beyond Pain (Claire Schoen produced Jan. 1,
2004) (transcript available at http://www.prx.org/pieces/5305/transcripts/5305).
117. See Liz Kowalczyk, Doctors Don’t Report Colleagues, Errors: Study Finds Practices at
Odds with Beliefs, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 4, 2007, at A1.
118. See, e.g., Brief for SSM Health Care System, et al. as Amici Curiae at 9, Cruzan v. Dir.,
Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (No. 88-1503); Thomas Finucane, Thinking About
Life-Sustaining Treatment Late in the Life of a Demented Person, 35 GA. L. REV. 691, 695 (2001)
(emphasizing the importance of viewing both overtreatment and undertreatment as serious
issues).
119. James Gibson, Doctrinal Feedback and (Un)reasonable Care, 94 VA. L. REV. 1641,
1644–45 (2008) (discussing the impact of overcompliance with formal legal standards in the
context of tort law).
120. See Martino, supra note 97, at 340.
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If, however, the hospital then revokes the doctor’s staff privileges as a
result of the CME agreement,121 that penalty has been magnified
exponentially.122 While one might assume that the hospital’s action supports
the legal effort, it is, in fact, levying a much more serious penalty than the
public agency may have believed necessary or appropriate. The heightened
risks to a doctor contemplating treating particular patients (for example,
chronic pain patients, pain patients with a history of substance abuse) or
providing particular treatments (for example, opioids for chronic pain) may
deter the doctor from those choices.123
If the doctor is deterred from providing inappropriate or harmful treatment,
there is no loss and only gain when private organizations magnify the penalty
levied by the governmental agency. If, however, the doctor is an early
adopter124 of newer and perhaps more evidence-based medical knowledge,
raising the penalties through this “double enforcement” by public and private
entities prevents patients from receiving effective and necessary care. In the
case of pain management, for example, early adopters of new knowledge
regarding the effectiveness and safety of the long-term use of opioids in higher
volumes than had been customarily prescribed were frequently investigated by
the state medical boards.125 The CME compromise can operate as a release
valve in the regulatory process to create some space for accommodating
emerging standards and change in medical practice and medical knowledge.
The CME compromise is not an entirely satisfactory resolution of the
regulatory challenge to accommodate change, of course, but at least its effect,
and its threat, is not as dire as it would be if the doctor knew that agreeing to
CME would result in loss of his livelihood due to termination or limitation by
the hospital or health plans on which he depended.126 Thus, double
enforcement by private organizations of public penalties may carry quite
negative effects as well as the positive effects for which mobilization of private
organizations in the service of legal standards is usually praised.

121. Hospitals are required to consult the National Practitioner Data Bank, to which state
medical boards are required to report disciplinary actions, as a part of the hospital’s credentialing
process. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131–11137 (2000); see
ALISON MCCHRYSTAL BARNES, HEALTH CARE LAW DESK REFERENCE 41 (2001).
122. See Martino, supra note 97, at 340 (reporting incidences of such actions and discussing
their implications on physician prescribing behavior).
123. Id. at 341.
124. See, e.g., Shana Campbell Jones et al., The Interoperable Electronic Health Record:
Preserving Its Promise by Recognizing and Limiting Physician Liability, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
75, 83 (2008) (discussing liability risks of early adopters of electronic health record systems).
125. Sandra H. Johnson, Disciplinary Actions and Pain Relief: Analysis of the Pain Relief
Act, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 319, 320 (1996).
126. But see discussion infra Part II.D (penalties of the process).
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The interests at stake in establishing private ordering within health care
institutions do not necessarily represent the breadth of interests at stake in the
adoption of legal standards. The enforcement of legal duties and rights carries
clearly stated formal penalties. Formal penalties usually take into account the
seriousness of the violations and weigh a number of competing factors,
including fairness, proportionality, protection of the public, repeat offenses, the
potential for rehabilitation, and conflicting substantive regulatory goals.127 The
severity of the punishment that follows a violation of legal standards figures
substantially into the deterrent effect of the law with more severe penalties, at
least theoretically, producing a greater margin of avoidance. While voluntary
compliance is the essential goal of legal standards, health care organizations do
not contribute to this effort when they reinterpret legal requirements in ways
that alter the balance of risk and benefit and the competing policies in the
original standard. More—more caution, more risk-aversion, more penalties—
is not necessarily better.128
D. From the Shadows, Too: All’s Not Well that Ends Well
The enforcement process itself also imposes significant penalties in the
course of identifying violators. These penalties are distinct from formal
penalties levied after a conclusive finding that a violation has occurred. These

127. See generally Michael A. Simons, Prosecutors as Punishment Theorists: Seeking
Sentencing Justice, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 303 (2009) (arguing prosecutors should consider
these punishment theories in assessing appropriate potential sentences for crimes charged). The
question of “regulatory balance” in enforcement practices in the context of conflicting goals
appears in regulatory literature generally and in health care policy in particular. See, e.g.,
Johnson, supra note 95 (describing questions of regulatory balance in enforcement efforts related
to controlled substances); Brian Rubens, Common Law Versus Regulatory Fraud: Parsing the
Intent Requirement of the Felony Penalty Provision of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 72 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1501, 1529 (2005) (arguing that the judicial requirement of specific intent upsets the
regulatory balance struck in the statutory fraud provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA)); Jeffrey Rudd, Regulating the Impacts of Engineered Nanoparticles Under TCSA:
Shifting Authority from Industry to Government, 33 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 215 (2008)
(recommending that the Environmental Protection Agency must strike the appropriate regulatory
balance between safety and new product development).
128. Private organizations may amplify the penalties of the investigative process (as distinct
from actual sanctions) by penalizing—formally or informally—those who are investigated but
against whom ultimately no action is filed or sanction levied. See Goldner, supra note 74, at
342–43 (discussing federally mandated scientific misconduct investigations and procedures).
Goldner describes the results of a survey of researchers accused of misconduct but where no
misconduct was found, but who nonetheless suffered subsequent penalties, such as loss of
employment, promotions, or salary increases; ostracism; reduction in research or support staff;
and other actions. Id. at 342. Goldner argues that institutions need to address the issue of private
penalties for persons investigated but cleared of misconduct charges. Id. at 343. See also
discussion infra Part II.D (penalties of investigations).
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“penalties of the process”129 exert their own deterrent effect.130 When
substantial, they will produce avoidance behaviors on the part of those who
might fall within the investigative net even though the likelihood that they will
be subject to formal sanctions is nil or close to it. 131
The deterrence effect of these informal penalties may produce results that
actually undermine the goals of the formal legal requirements. Yet, they are all
but invisible—they make no appearance in the formal description of the
standards and procedures incorporated in the law. The best information
available concerning the operation of this shadow system of enforcement
comes from the people who experience it, those doctors who claim that there is
“bad law” causing them to avoid doing the right thing.
This particular form of “bad law” claim was demonstrated dramatically in
a 1996 conference focusing on the prescribing of controlled substances for pain
patients.132 In a small workshop for that conference, the president of the
Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB), an organization of state medical
boards, presented the boards’ standards and practices relating to physicians’
prescribing opioids for their chronic pain patients. He argued that the boards’
standards and enforcement practices were not impediments to prescribing these
drugs as they did not target physicians prescribing these medications
legitimately. Dr. Kathleen Hoover, a doctor who had been subject to
disciplinary proceedings in Florida for her prescription of controlled
substances for her patients in pain, was in the audience.133 Dr. Hoover asked
the official how he squared his view that the standards and processes used by
the boards were legitimate and did not impede good care with the fact that the
Florida board had subjected her to discipline for that very practice. Noting that
the Florida board’s penalty ultimately had been overturned by the Florida
Court of Appeals in Dr. Hoover’s case, he responded that everything had
turned out alright in the end in her case.134 After two years of expensive and
129. The classic analysis of the effect of the costs of pursuing adjudication of legal violations
was studied in the context of criminal prosecutions and plea bargains. MALCOLM M. FEELEY,
THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 199–201,
235–43 (1979).
130. This section of the paper focuses on the deterrent effect of legal enforcement systems.
Deterrence is a major goal and effect of regulatory systems; however, significant research and
theory argues that compliance with legal norms may be stimulated by positive understandings of
moral or social obligations rather than fear of penalty alone. See Peter J. May, Compliance
Motivations: Affirmative and Negative Bases, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 41 (2004).
131. See discussion of investigations infra Part IV.B.
132. Am. Soc’y of Law, Med. & Ethics, National Meeting on Legal, Ethical, and Institutional
Issues in Pain Relief (Nov. 1–2, 1996).
133. See Hoover v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 676 So.2d 1380 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996).
134. He did not make an argument that the disciplinary action was appropriate in her case.
The Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency) submitted the Board’s recommendation for
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wrenching litigation contesting the sanctions levied against her, Dr. Hoover did
not exactly agree. Furthermore, physicians were quite aware of the litigation
in Dr. Hoover’s case as well as similar cases in several other states at the time,
and it hardly altered their risk calculus that the sanctions ultimately were
overturned by an appellate court.135
Doctors’ fear of the actions of state medical boards relating to their caring
for patients in chronic pain focused on the very threshold of disciplinary
action. They feared the investigative process itself because of the heavy costs
it placed on the individual physician. State medical boards viewed a letter of
inquiry, asking a doctor to respond to particular issues the board detected in its
surveillance of the physician’s prescribing,136 as a neutral and non-punitive
action that doctors who were engaged in legitimate practice had no reason to
fear.137 Doctors, on the other hand, called that communication the “$10,000
letter,”138 solely because of the financial costs of responding: many would hire
an attorney to advise them on how to respond (as they believed that their
license to practice was at risk) and every doctor would take time away from

disciplinary action to the state’s administrative hearings commission for a hearing, and the
hearing officer concluded that the agency had failed to meet its burden of proof. Id. at 1382.
Despite the hearing officer’s findings and conclusions, the Board disciplined Dr. Hoover,
including a reprimand, a $4000 fine, mandatory CME on prescribing abusable drugs, and two
years probation. Id.
135. At the time of the conference, only ten states, including Florida, had statutes that
addressed the prescription of controlled substances for the treatment of intractable pain, and only
six of those statutes addressed the concern of disciplinary action. Chris Stern Hyman, Pain
Management and Disciplinary Action: How Medical Boards Can Remove Barriers to Effective
Treatment, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 338, 340 (1996). Only twelve more states had guidelines or
regulations on the subject. Id. at 341. In 1998, as the result of a working group that included a
representative from the American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics (ASLME) project group
that developed the 1996 conference, the Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB) adopted a
set of model guidelines to encourage state medical boards to reform their standards and practices.
Sandra H. Johnson, Providing Relief to Those in Pain: A Retrospective on the Scholarship and
Impact of the Mayday Project, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 15, 16 (2003); see also FED’N OF STATE
MED. BDS. OF THE U.S., INC., MODEL POLICY FOR THE USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES FOR
THE TREATMENT OF PAIN (2004) [hereinafter FSMB, MODEL POLICY], available at
http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/2004_grpol_Controlled_Substances.pdf. By 2002, twenty-three states
had enacted legislation and more than forty states had adopted policy statements, guidelines, or
regulations. Johnson, supra, at 22, 19 n.24.
136. See discussion infra Part IV.B (prescription monitoring).
137. In a survey of medical board personnel, one commented that “[d]octors like to cry foul
anytime we inquire about anything” but that the board’s obligation to protect patients justified
inquiries. Diane E. Hoffmann & Anita J. Tarzian, Achieving the Right Balance in Oversight of
Physician Opioid Prescribing for Pain: The Role of State Medical Boards, 31 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 21, 32 (2003).
138. Heart-to-Heart Radio Series Program I: Beyond Pain, supra note 116.
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their practice to review charts and prepare responses.139 The penalties
embedded in the process, including disruption of practice, damage to
reputation and to necessary business relationships, and stress and shame, were
so severe that it became clear that “[t]he most effective antidote to the
physicians’ fear [was] ensuring that state medical boards [were] not
investigating . . . physicians who treat pain appropriately.”140
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the power of the
investigative process standing alone to alter physician behavior in Conant v.
Walters.141 In that case, the court considered the federal government’s policy
of investigating California doctors who discussed the medical use of marijuana
with their patients after the state had legalized its use for such purposes.142
Patients and doctors challenged the federal government’s policy as a violation
of the First Amendment and sought and received a permanent injunction
prohibiting the federal government from “threatening” and investigating such
physicians.143 The suit did not challenge any sanctions against specific

139. See Linda Pembrook, How to Survive a State Board Investigation, PAIN MED. NEWS,
May–June 2007, at 1, 1, 10, for a discussion between a doctor and lawyer regarding the conduct
of a medical board during an inquiry into the doctor’s prescribing practices, in which ultimately
all potential charges were dismissed by the board. The doctor describes the notice that gave her
fourteen days to prepare and submit “certified true copies of the [requested] medical records,” a
summary of those records, and a notarized affidavit. Id. at 10. Seven days had already passed by
the time the letter was received. Id. Summarizing the records posed a challenge as the inquiry
letter did not specify any particular concern. The doctor reports that she needed to seek counsel
to answer the following questions:
[W]hat constitutes a certified true copy? Can I send copies of copies? If I sign an
affidavit certifying that these are copies of copies, but I’m not sure of that fact, did I just
perjure myself? Do I really have to respond within 14 days? If I write a summary of what
happened, should I write a little or a lot? Should I account for what I did, what the nurses
did, what the patient did? Should I point out the patient’s deficiencies? . . . And why do
they want my billing records?
Id. The Pembrook article also notes that malpractice insurance ordinarily does not cover the costs
related to medical board inquiries or disciplinary actions. Id. See also Martino, supra note 97, at
340 (“To be investigated or sanctioned by a board could result in a loss of stature, reputation,
institutional privileges, or access to insurance panels.”).
140. Hyman, supra note 135, at 338 (emphasis added).
141. 309 F.3d 629, 638–39 (9th Cir. 2002).
142. Id. at 632–33.
143. Id. at 633–34. This lawsuit was narrowly targeted to reach only the case of physicians
discussing or recommending but not prescribing or distributing marijuana in a clinical setting. Id.
at 632, 634. In United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483, 486
(2001), the Supreme Court upheld the Controlled Substances Act classification of marijuana as a
Schedule-I drug that cannot be prescribed legally, against a claim that the Act implied a “medical
necessity” defense that would allow physicians to prescribe the drug for patients in certain
circumstances. In Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005), the Supreme Court upheld the
Controlled Substances Act as within the scope of the power of the federal government under the
Commerce Clause.
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physicians; it merely challenged the investigative process.144 The injunction
issued by the District Court prohibited the federal government from “initiating
any investigation solely on” the basis of “a recommendation for the use of
medical marijuana based on a sincere medical judgment.”145 The Ninth Circuit
upheld the injunction based on the impact of threatened investigation on
practicing doctors.146
Reporting requirements, which generally would indicate heightened
prospects for investigation, can themselves alter behavior. The case of the use
of physical restraints in nursing homes illustrates this point. Rates of 25–85%
of residents in restraints were not uncommon among nursing homes in the late
1980s.147 No government regulation required that nursing homes physically
restrain their ambulatory residents to prevent them from falling or wandering,
but falls and unsupervised departures from the facility required, at a minimum,
that an incident report be filed with the regulatory agency and could trigger
government investigation or inquiry.148 Tying a patient to a bed or a chair did
not require that an incident report be filed nor would it cause any serious
inquiry from the government agency. Simply doing the bad thing—restraining
the resident—became the course that was not penalized by the system. Such a

144. Conant, 309 F.3d at 633. The federal government agreed with the plaintiffs that a doctor
who merely discussed marijuana with his patients would not violate federal law (the Controlled
Substances Act), and the plaintiffs agreed with the federal government that doctors who actually
prescribed or dispensed the drug would be in violation of the Act. Id. at 633–34. In essence, the
suit concerned whether a recommendation, standing alone, violated the Act and whether a policy
of investigating physicians who merely discussed or recommended marijuana to their patients
violated the First Amendment. Id. at 632.
145. Id. at 634 (quoting Conant v. McCaffrey, No. C97-00139 WHA, 2000 WL 1281174, at
*16 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2000), aff’d sub nom. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002)).
The appellate court’s majority opinion notes that the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
agreed that physicians who recommended marijuana to their patients should “have a genuine fear
of losing” their prescribing permit. Id. at 639. Judge Kozinski, in his concurring opinion, quoted
the report submitted by an expert who said that “[a] physician’s career can be effectively
destroyed merely by the fact that a governmental body has investigated his or her practice.” Id. at
640 n.2 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
146. See Conant, 309 F.3d at 638–39. See also Sermchief v. Gonzales, 660 S.W.2d 683, 684–
85 (Mo. 1983) (en banc), where the court awarded plaintiff nurses and physicians a declaratory
judgment that the medical practice act was not violated by the work of the nurse practitioners in a
situation where the board had simply “threatened to order the . . . nurses and physicians” to prove
that the nurses were not guilty of the unauthorized practice of medicine. The board had taken no
formal action against the nurses (or against the doctors for aiding and abetting the unauthorized
practice of medicine in their work with the nurses), but the doctors reasonably feared that they
would be so charged and argued that they would discontinue working with the nurses if the threat
persisted. See id. at 684 & n.1 (emphasis added).
147. Laurence Z. Rubenstein et al., Falls in the Nursing Home, 121 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
442, 449 (1994).
148. See supra text accompanying notes 15–20.
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state of affairs communicated an unmistakable message: What did the
regulations require? They required restraints. 149 It hardly mattered that no
government regulation could be found to support that commonly held belief.150
Penalties of the process are magnified when enforcement employs the
Law enforcement personnel
accoutrements of criminal prosecution.151
understand the power of public arrest, handcuffing, seizure of property, and
disruption of business to dramatize the government’s power and the
grievousness of the personal misconduct. The arrest ritual communicates a
powerful message to potential perpetrators: be afraid of us; be very afraid. For
physicians at least, the “be very afraid” message is heard by good and bad
alike, and it would not be surprising if the good (as well as the bad) alter their
behavior accordingly, and not in a desirable direction.
149. One of the significant changes in federal regulations to address the excessive use of
restraints was the inclusion of the percentage of residents physically restrained as an element in
the Minimum Data Set required to be reported to the federal government by each nursing home.
See Katherine Berg et al., Identification and Evaluation of Existing Nursing Home Quality
Indicators, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Summer 2002, at 19, 20–21, 32–33. The more recent
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Nursing Home Quality Initiative includes the rate of
restraint use as a quality indicator. See Jennifer L. Hilliard, The Nursing Home Quality Initiative:
Shift in Policy, Shift in Paradigm, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 41, 52–53 (2005).
150. Even after federal regulations were adopted to restrict the use of physical restraints in
nursing homes, the practice persisted. According to providers, concerns about liability risks were
at least a partial motivation for the use of physical restraints. See, e.g., Joseph Francis, Letter to
the Editor, Using Restraints on the Elderly Because of Fear of Litigation, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED.
870, 870 (1989) (describing a newsletter from a malpractice insurance carrier concerning
malpractice claims for falls by elderly patients and addressing the use of restraints to prevent
those falls). An empirical study of a claims-filed database, the incidence of claims against
nursing homes generally, and court opinions addressing liability for falls and wandering, proved
that the liability concerns were unfounded. Sandra H. Johnson, The Fear of Liability and the Use
of Restraints in Nursing Homes, 18 J.L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 263, 264–65 (1990). In addition,
emerging actions for injuries due to the inappropriate use of physical restraints counterbalanced
the risk of liability for falls. Id. at 267. Eventually, rates of nursing home residents in restraints
declined so that rates of no more than 5% are common, and many facilities aim at 0% restraint
use. See Bruce C. Vladeck, The Past, Present and Future of Nursing Home Quality, 275 JAMA
425, 425 (1996) (noting the reduction in the use of restraints after the regulations were in place).
Of course, the effort to reduce restraint use involved more than changing the law. See, e.g.,
Catherine Hawes et al., The OBRA-87 Nursing Home Regulations and Implementation of the
Resident Assessment Instrument: Effects on Process Quality, 45 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 977,
978, 984 (1997) (citing the overall need to reduce “[p]oor care practices,” which included the use
of physical restraints). The fact that the reform effort involved more than legal change does not
alter the fact that claimed “bad law” was influential in perpetuating the practice.
151. See Burris et al., supra note 11, at 7–8 (discussing criminal sanctions associated with
prescribing and dispensing sterile syringes to injection drug users) ; Diane E. Hoffmann, Treating
Pain v. Reducing Drug Diversion and Abuse: Recalibrating the Balance in Our Drug Control
Laws and Policies, 1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 231, 233 (2009) (“In the course of the
last decade federal and state prosecutors have arrested and charged several hundred physicians
with criminal violations related to their prescribing of opioid analgesics.”).
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The decision of what has to be reported; whom to investigate; when to
make an inquiry; how to dramatize an arrest—are all powerful enforcement
tools in themselves.152 These mid-level policy decisions can upset the balance
sought to be achieved in the formal standard-setting process, but they are
usually undocumented and rarely studied. In particular, reporting requirements
and investigations do more than produce raw material for oversight and
sanctions. Standing alone and apart from the decision to sanction, they exert
an influence on physician behavior. Thus, they create a shadow system or
rogue standards that doctors experience and report in “bad law” claims that can
so easily be dismissed as either insincere153 or misinformed.154
E.

Differential Diagnosis: The Rules Are Wrong

Sometimes physicians’ claims that the legal standard is bad are correct: the
rules are wrong. The doctors are not dishonest or mistaken; and the formal
rule is not being perverted by a shadow system: it is just wrong.155
This certainly was the case with physician complaints that state medical
boards were using the wrong standards in investigating and penalizing doctors
for prescribing opioids over the long term and in larger amounts than used
After an
traditionally for patients with chronic non-cancer pain.156
investigation that included review of all news articles over a two-year period,
phone and written surveys of state medical board members concerning
standards and practices, review of written board policies, and review of statutes
and judicial opinions, we found that, in fact, the rules were wrong.157 Medical
boards did sanction doctors for prescribing opioids appropriately for this
patient population.158

152. See discussion of recommended adjustments to these decisions infra Part IV.
153. See discussion supra Part II.A.
154. See discussion supra Part II.B.
155. Although this analysis is a differential diagnosis in that other causes for the “bad law”
claim are ruled out, “bad law” claims can overlap. Some of the examples discussed in this
section, for example, also appear in other sections. Because the categories in this taxonomy are
intended to focus responses as well as identify problems, however, it is useful to identify each of
the categories into which a particular situation may fall.
156. See, for example, Hoover v. Agency for Health Care Administration, 676 So.2d 1380,
1381–83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996), in which the only evidence against the doctor who was
sanctioned for her prescribing of pain medication was provided by two physicians who testified
that they never cared for patients in chronic pain and who admitted that they had not reviewed her
patient’s medical records, but who testified based on the pharmacy printouts alone that she had
prescribed “excessive, perhaps lethal amounts” of the drugs and a “tremendous number of pills.”
See text accompanying notes 132–135.
157. Johnson, supra note 125.
158. Symposium, Appropriate Management of Pain: Addressing the Clinical, Legal, and
Regulatory Barriers, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 285 (1996).
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The conclusion that the rules are wrong can rest on a number of pragmatic
and normative bases. The error, for example, may be a matter of the
knowledge base on which the rule relies; a matter of the ethical principles it
adopts; or a matter of the perspective which the rule assumes. In each of these,
good law can become bad law just as good medicine can become bad
medicine.
Rules that may have been right become wrong when the knowledge base in
medicine shifts.159 For health care regulation, the challenges of changes in
technology receive considerable attention, but advances in knowledge,
especially when those advances proceed in fits and starts, present significant
challenges as well.160 Rules prohibiting or penalizing the prescription of
opioids for chronic pain, for example, were based in part on false notions that
they are highly addictive and probably lethal.161 The reporting system
requiring reports of falls but not of the use of restraints162 relied on mistaken
but commonly held knowledge that restraints made people safe when instead
even apparently benign restraints like bedrails caused significant injuries.163
Underlying ethical principles that support customary practice can also
come to be viewed as mistaken as applied in particular situations. For
example, in the case of pain management, the customary practice of
withholding effective medication was based on strongly held beliefs that the
drugs were addicting. Even for terminally ill cancer patients, concerns over
addicting the patient caused doctors to withhold necessary pain medicine with

159. Changes in social knowledge also may reveal how a rule is wrong. For example, a
recent investigation, by the Los Angeles Times, of the use of presumed consent for tissue retrieval
revealed that it was applied in a fashion that caused a significant race-based disparate impact,
with the vast majority of “donors” coming from racial minorities. See Michele Goodwin,
Deconstructing Legislative Consent Law: Organ Taking, Racial Profiling, & Distributive Justice,
6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2, ¶¶ 1–7 (2001), http://www.vjolt.net/vol6/issue1/v6i1a02-Goodwin.html;
see also Burris et al., supra note 11 (finding that state laws which make “physicians and
pharmacists the gatekeepers to syringe access” may be wrong in light of evidence regarding
benefits of needle exchanges).
160. For a discussion of this problem in relation to the regulation of off-label prescribing, see
Johnson, supra note 30.
161. Russell K. Portenoy, Opioid Therapy for Chronic Nonmalignant Pain: Clinicians’
Perspective, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 296, 296, 299–303 (1996).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 147–50.
163. Neville E. Strumpf & Lois K. Evans, Physical Restraints of the Hospitalized Elderly:
Perceptions of Patients and Nurses, 37 NURSING RES. 132, 132 (1988); see also Johnson supra
note 150, at 263 (“The risks of using restraints on elderly patients are serious and substantial.
These risks include strangulation, medical ailments caused by immobility, and increased agitation
. . . [and] can lead to misdiagnosis due to masking of symptoms . . . . ”); Morning Edition:
Bedrails Can Cause Deaths in Frail, Elderly (NPR radio broadcast June 29, 2006), available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5519589 (discussing FDA guidelines
aimed at curtailing physical entrapment of patients in bedrails used on hospital beds).
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tragic results.164 Eventually, that beneficence norm as applied to the terminally
ill was challenged, with stronger arguments made that the relief of pain was
morally superior to the avoidance of addiction in a dying person.165 Once the
ethic changed, doctors then began to provide the drugs in larger doses.166 As
more people lived with cancer over a longer time, a body of evidence
regarding long-term and higher-dose use of opioids developed. This new
learning indicated that the risk of addiction of patients in pain was very remote,
ultimately benefiting chronic pain patients as well.167 In the case of physical
restraints, the normative framework for care of nursing home residents gave
primacy to keeping the residents safe.168 Developing a new framework, one
that valued functioning and social interaction, was required to offset a
generation of normative training that had encouraged nurses and doctors to
engage in restraining patients despite the distress experienced by patient and
caregiver alike.169
Perspective conflicts are played out in the public policy arena where
stakeholders argue for competing notions of good policy. Perspective is more
than rational argument about data or values; it emerges from one’s experience
or empathy. 170 For example, if one experiences or empathizes with suffering
caused by unnecessary pain, one favors increasing easy access to effective pain
medications and is likely to have more tolerance for the risks of addiction and
diversion. If the miseries of addiction inform one’s perspective, it is likely to
lead to a rule with very low tolerance for the use of narcotics that can be

164. June L. Dahl & David E. Joranson, The Wisconsin Cancer Pain Initiative, in 16
ADVANCES IN PAIN RESEARCH AND THERAPY 499, 499 (K.M. Foley et al. eds., 1990).
165. Moral claims to aggressive pain management in end-of-life care have their parallel in
law. See Robert A. Burt, The Supreme Court Speaks: Not Assisted Suicide but a Constitutional
Right to Palliative Care, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1234, 1235–36 (1997).
166. Bridget M. Kuehn, Opioid Prescriptions Soar: Increase in Legitimate Use as Well as
Abuse, 297 JAMA 249, 249–50 (2007). There are still significant concerns over the inadequacy
of pain management at the end of life. See Kathryn L. Tucker, The Chicken and the Egg: The
Pursuit of Choice for a Human Hastened-Death as a Catalyst for Improved End-of-Life Care;
Improved End-of-Life Care as a Precondition for Legalization of Assisted Dying, 60 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 355, 375 (2004) (demanding accountability for the failure to “treat pain
adequately” during end-of-life care); see also Jill L. Loeb, Pain Management in Long-Term Care,
99 AM. J. NURSING 48 (1999) (discussing factors that contribute to the “high incidence of
inadequately controlled pain” among residents in long-term-care facilities).
167. See Portenoy, supra note 161, at 303.
168. Rosalie A. Kane & Robert L. Kane, Long-Term Care: Variations on a Quality
Assurance Theme, 25 INQUIRY 132, 135–36 (1988).
169. Strumpf & Evans, supra note 163, at 132, 136–37.
170. See, e.g., Katherine Beckett & Bruce Hoffman, Challenging Medicine: Law, Resistance,
and the Cultural Politics of Childbirth, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 125, 158, 162–63 (2005)
(describing empirical studies of legislative processes concerning recognition of midwifery
demonstrating that legislators’ personal experience with midwives or childbirth greatly influenced
their position on proposed legislation).
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addictive or can be diverted. If one assumes the perspective of persons dying
of preventable infectious disease, it is likely to produce a stronger claim for
distribution of sterile needles to prevent transmission. If, on the other hand,
one is drawn to the suffering of addiction, the distribution of sterile needles
might be resisted as removing a real or symbolic obstacle to illegal drug use.171
Of course, these perspectives may not present true conflict, but instead may be
reconcilable given appropriate information and resources for response. In most
cases, however, perspective differences do at some point remain at odds, and a
value choice as to what degree or direction of error is acceptable will have to
be made.172
Even government agencies may not share the same perspective. For
example, as the FSMB was adjusting medical board standards and practices to
accommodate greater access to pain medication, the federal Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) was establishing stricter standards, criminalization, and
aggressive prosecution.173 This conflict persists because of a difference in
perspective of the two agencies. The FSMB identifies its mission as promoting
good medicine.174 The DEA identifies its mission as preventing the abuse and
diversion of drugs.175 The problem is not confined to morally charged areas of
law, such as drug policy, of course.176 In all cases, however, when government
agencies are engaged in a conflict over the appropriate standard or policy, the
subjects of their regulation have to view one of the rules as wrong. In fact, one
may argue that truly conflicting regulations are by definition wrong.

171. See Burris et al., supra note 11.
172. Bill Sage persuasively argues that the reductionist tendency to personalize health reform
issues inappropriately narrows the focus to the physician-patient dyad and excludes consideration
of collective costs and benefits. Sage, supra note 67, at 500.
173. See, e.g., Letter from the Nat’l Ass’n of Att’y Gens. to Karen P. Tandy, Adm’r, DEA
(Jan. 19, 2005) (on file with Saint Louis University Law Journal) (regarding the DEA’s
revocation of its posted FAQ that indicated the agency’s agreement with the standards used by
state medical boards and its move toward criminalizing physician prescribing, stating that “state
and federal policies are diverging with respect to the relative emphasis on ensuring the
availability of prescription pain medications to those who need them”).
174. Fed’n of State Med. Bds., Mission Vision, Core Values and Goals, http://www.fsmb.org/
mission.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2009).
175. U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA Briefs & Background, Drug Policy, DEA
Mission Statement, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/agency/mission.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2009)
176. See Mello et al., supra note 32, at 381 (“Uncoordinated pluralistic regulation may result
in overlapping and conflicting mandates.”).
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III. RESPONDING TO PHYSICIANS’ FEARS OF LEGAL RISK
Physicians’ claims that law is compelling bad medicine often generate a
response aimed at relieving their fears and reducing or managing the legal risk,
real or perceived, so that doctors can freely engage in the socially desirable
behaviors threatened by the operation of the putative bad law. This section
examines four of the most common responses to physician complaints about
bad law. The responses selected for discussion below include redoubling
educational efforts to relieve doctors’ concerns; enacting immunity legislation
addressing the specific source of risk; establishing legal safe harbors; and
eliminating asymmetry.177
Each of these responses, in theory, should work to relieve physicians of the
fear of legal entanglement that they report leads them to make different
medical decisions than they otherwise would and should have. These common
responses, however, are relatively ineffective in achieving their intended goal.
In fact, in some circumstances, the efforts to quell physicians’ legal concerns
may produce negative outcomes of their own. As the following sections
demonstrate, however, the failure of these efforts does not in itself prove that
the original complaint was dishonest or misinformed.
A.

Education

An assessment of particular legal requirements and their implementation
may provide convincing evidence that physicians’ fears of the law in a
particular practice context are based on misinformation or misunderstanding.
The first and most common response in this situation is simply to tell the
doctors that this is so, to engage in educational activities to allay their concerns
and assure them that they can provide good medical care without fear. These
efforts are extraordinarily common in health law. As an educator, I am hardly
one to argue that they are not very effective—but they probably are not.
Elsewhere, I have written about the weak impact of didactic forms of
continuing medical education upon physician practices.178 Physicians absorb

177. Legislatures and regulators have adopted other responses to physicians’ “bad law”
claims, including the adoption of strong presumptions of legal compliance as in the context of
informed consent. See supra text accompanying notes 36–47. Furthermore, some claims of bad
law asserted by physicians are really “there ought to be a law” claims in which the doctors argue
that the legislature should act to protect them and their patients from harm worked by private
ordering. See generally Diane E. Hoffmann, Physicians Who Break the Law, 53 ST. LOUIS L.J.
1049, 1084–88 (2009). Significant examples of such claims have produced legislation regarding
managed care, including state laws against “drive-through deliveries”; laws prohibiting health
plans from terminating doctors for “advocating” for patients; and laws requiring health plans to
pay for emergency services without prior authorization.
178. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 30, at 77–81; see also Lars Noah, Medicine’s
Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical Community, 44
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the information transmitted in such programs, but do not conform their
treatment decisions to this new information.179 There is no reason to think that
education about legal standards would fare better in changing physician legalrisk-avoidance behavior. The educational techniques that have a proven effect
in altering physician behavior, (such as multiple contacts between instructor
and student following a learn-work-learn sequence; information that is
provided at the exact point of an expressed need to know; comparative
information on the behavior of other physicians; follow up with personal phone
calls; and proctoring and shadowing)180 are not the ones we generally use for
legal education of physicians.
Even dismissing the data about physician learning generally, one is left
with the substantial problem of designing content that would actually assuage
physicians’ fears of the risk of legal entanglement. The task of designing such
an educational effort quickly reveals characteristics within the law, including
its indeterminacy and the multiple perspectives emerging from attorneys’ role
identification, which doctors complaining of bad law may experience as
threatening rather than comforting.
First, the analysis of the content and application of legal standards to
medical practice requires some skill.181 There are few simple yes-or-no
answers.182 Where legal requirements are at all dependent on the particular
facts of the case, understanding what the law requires, or rather will require,183
calls for the exercise of significant professional skill and judgment. Is this case

ARIZ. L. REV. 373 (2002) (discussing the “horizontal process” by which medical professionals
learn and share information and its effects on law).
179. Dave Davis et al., Impact of Formal Continuing Medical Education, 282 JAMA 867,
873 (1999) (basing its conclusion that such programs “have little or no role to play” in changing
physician practice on a meta-analysis of studies on the effect of didactic CME).
180. Id. at 870–71. These methods are used in pharmaceutical detailing. See Wayne Kondro,
Academic Drug Detailing: An Evidence-Based Alternative, 176 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 429, 430
(2007). They also bear similarities to ethics consultation in hospitals, which operates as both a
problem-solving intervention for difficult treatment decisions and an educational opportunity for
the health care professionals whose cases are subject to consultative services.
181. See Scott Burris et al., Federalism, Policy Learning, and Local Innovation in Public
Health: The Case of the Supervised Injection Facility, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1089, 1110 & n.106
(2009).
182. Sandra H. Johnson, Five Easy Pieces: Motifs in Health Law, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 131,
134 (2004); Johnson & Goldner, supra note 115, at 68 (advising hospitals on the limitations of
legal advice).
183. See Louis M. Brown & Thomas L. Shaffer, Toward a Jurisprudence for the Law Office,
17 AM. J. JURIS. 125, 133–34 (1972), in an early work on “preventive law,” describing the
relationship of law and fact and distinguishing the “fact-law” analysis used to identify rights and
duties after an event has occurred and the “law-fact” analysis used to make decisions in advance
of legal disputes. In the litigation context, the facts are “cold” or “hard,” indicating that they can
not be changed; in the law office context, the facts are “hot” or “soft,” indicating that there are
decisions to be made in which the law is not necessarily the determining factor. Id. at 134.
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just like the case that the courts have already decided, or is it different in some
significant way?184
Furthermore, the infrequency of written judicial opinions and authoritative
case law usually presents a connect-the-dots puzzle for legal counsel in which
some important dots are missing. For example, even in an area such as
discontinuing treatment at the end of life,185 where there are enough judicial
opinions to provide the fodder for an extensive treatise,186 any one state may
have no more than one or two such cases. In fact, with few exceptions,187 this
is the reality for most states. Take, for example, the state of Missouri.
Lawyers in this state have two cases,188 and no substantive statutes,189 on
which to base their judgments as to what the law in Missouri requires of
physicians in providing or withholding treatment from incompetent patients in
the absence of an advance directive. The only case to have reached the state’s
supreme court, Cruzan v. Harmon,190 involved a patient in persistent vegetative
state where the treatment at issue was nutrition and hydration. Do the
standards in that case—that clear and convincing evidence of the patient’s
choice is required, and is adequate for withdrawal of treatment—extend to
cases where the patient is minimally conscious or suffering? To cases where
the treatment is chemotherapy? To cases where the patient was never
competent to make a decision? How does a significant change in the
composition of the court factor into our advice? Lawyers routinely refer to the
case law of other states, but deciding whether Missouri’s courts will follow the
courts of other states requires educated guessing.191
184. The discussion in this subsection addresses the analysis of case law only as an
illustration. Of course, case analysis alone is an inadequate methodology for developing any
meaningful description of what the law is. Sage, supra note 82, at 61. See generally Burris et al.,
supra note 181, at 1142–47.
185. Other similar issues arise with the physician’s duty to warn third parties of imminent
danger presented by a patient, an exception to the physician’s duty of confidentiality. See 7
MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 7A-5 (2d. ed. 1998).
Once again, the rule is extremely fact-sensitive, and written court opinions in any one state are
few in number or nonexistent. Id.
186. ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF END-OFLIFE DECISIONMAKING § 12.01 n.1 (3d. ed. 2008) (describing end-of-life case law among the
states).
187. Id. California, New York, and Florida are among the exceptions.
188. In re Warren, 858 S.W. 2d 263 (Mo. App. 1993); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408
(Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
189. Cf. MO. ANN. STAT. § 459.040 (West 2007) (providing only for written designation of
an agent for decisionmaking); MO. ANN. STAT. § 459.010 (providing only for a written living
will). The state has no legislation providing for surrogate decisionmaking for an incompetent
patient without an advance directive.
190. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d. 408.
191. In fact, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected the work of the vast majority of the courts
in other states in its holding in Cruzan. See Sandra H. Johnson, From Medicalization to
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Deciding what the law is in such situations requires prognostication, and
reasonable and competent attorneys can disagree.192 Attorneys, therefore,
present a calculation of risk, using terms like “highly unlikely” and “probably
not.” It is hardly ever the case that lawyers can tell doctors: “I assure you that
you have nothing to be concerned about from the law. It is completely on your
side. You are safe.” Lawyers are trained to root out any possible risk in a
planned action and generally communicate that sense of heightened risk.193
So, instead, what doctors often hear lawyers say is: “Well, anyone with a filing
fee can sue you, but they are not going to win.” This consolation—intended to
inject humor and reality into a situation that a lawyer can see is based on fears
of nearly nonexistent eventualities—has to ring hollow to anyone who has
been the defendant in any suit, even one that is eventually dismissed. Instead
of reassurance, one could understand that this phrase would be heard as
confirmation of the unpredictability of the legal hammer.
Furthermore, law does not speak with one voice. Lawyers assume specific
roles in the health care environment (e.g., defense or plaintiff malpractice
litigator; prosecutor or regulator; academic; in-house counsel), and the content
and tenor of educational programs depend on the role identification of the
speaker. In the classic dichotomy, for example, the hospital’s or doctor’s
malpractice attorney is likely to tell quite a different story about the risk of
malpractice liability for particular decisions than will the law faculty member
invited to give the “law talk.”194 The fraud prosecutor or the attorney for the
medical board is likely to want to communicate a message of reasonableness in
their exercise of discretion, but maintain a strong emphasis on deterrence.
Threats against the bad apples in the profession are internalized by the
audience of good doctors who identify with colleagues in trouble and see a fine
line between themselves and these other doctors.195
At times, the message even from a single legal voice is deeply conflicting.
Medical boards, for example, typically have used their newsletters to announce
new policies or issue statements to encourage physicians to provide effective

Legalization to Politicization: O’Connor, Cruzan, and Refusal of Treatment in the 1990s, 21
CONN. L. REV. 685, 695–96 (1989).
192. Thaddeus Mason Pope, for example, takes issue with nearly every earlier attempt to
describe the law as it applies to medical futility. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Involuntary Passive
Euthanasia in U.S. Courts: Reassessing the Judicial Treatment of Medical Futility Cases, 9
MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR, 229, 238–41 (2008).
193. David Maister, The Trouble with Lawyers, AM. LAWYER, Apr. 2006, at 97, 100
(“Probabilities do not seem to influence the discussion, only possibilities. There is no greater
condemnation in legal discourse than to describe something as risky.”).
194. See KAPP, supra note 24, at 18.
195. Bosk noted, for example, that “[s]urgeons are loathe to judge the technical performance
of others” because of a heightened sensitivity to the essential uncertainty of the practice of
medicine. BOSK, supra note 26, at 173.
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opioid treatment to patients in pain. In the same issue of that newsletter,
however, they might have a piece on their interest in looking at physicians who
are not vigilant about drug diversion.196 They also have published lists of
physicians disciplined, many of whom were disciplined for “prescribing
abuse” related to controlled substances, without any further explanation that
would show that the boards actually were using their new pain policy
statements.
Efforts to repeatedly assure physicians that there is little legal risk may
heighten rather than reduce anxiety. To the extent that physicians form their
understanding of legal requirements and legal risks from dramatizations in
newspapers, in industry newsletters, or in stories told by colleagues, telling
them that the information is false may not dislodge the power of the
narrative.197 Doctors were not relieved, for example, to read the DEA’s
statement, The Myth of the Chilling Effect: Doctors Operating Within Bounds
of Accepted Medical Practice Have Nothing to Fear from DEA.198 In this 2003
document, the DEA declared that they hardly ever arrested doctors, and
reported statistics that showed that out of nearly one million registrants, only
557 had been investigated; only 34 physicians had been arrested by the agency;
and only 441 had been sanctioned in any formal fashion during the first three
quarters of that year.199 At the same time, the agency was pursuing an
infamous criminal prosecution seeking a twenty-five year prison sentence
against Dr. William Hurwitz, whose story was well-known among physicians
treating pain patients, for his prescribing of controlled substances.200 The

196. The Texas State Board of Medical Examiners had adopted a policy to encourage
physicians to prescribe adequate controlled substances for the treatment of chronic pain, but its
newsletter instead published an article on “Narcotic Drug Prescribing” that stated that it was
“obligated by statute to . . . investigate complaints alleging that the licensee is prescribing . . .
what could be excessive quantities of drugs to persons who may be addicted to the medications.”
Ralston, supra note 94, at 328 (quoting Narcotic Drug Prescribing, MED. BD. REP. (Tex. State
Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, Austin, Tex.), Fall/Winter 1988, at 6). In a later newsletter, the Board
stated on the front page that “[t]he Board does not wish to inhibit the proper treatment of pain.
However, the Board will continue to be concerned about the inappropriate use of narcotics in
non-malignant conditions . . . .” Id. (quoting Narcotics and Pain Relief, MED. BD. REP. (Tex.
State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, Austin, Tex.), Spring/Summer 1992, at 1). The newsletter did not
mention the legislature’s newly enacted intractable pain act at all. Id.
197. See discussion supra Part II.B; see also, KAPP, supra note 24, at 12–14 (describing the
influence of these sources of information in leading doctors to vastly overestimate their risk of
being sued).
198. News Release, DEA, The Myth of the “Chilling Effect”: Doctors Operating Within
Bounds of Accepted Medical Practice Have Nothing to Fear from DEA (Oct. 30, 2003), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/pr103003.html.
199. Id.
200. Hoffmann, supra note 151, at 245–50.
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power of the Hurwitz narrative, carried on the back of distrust of the DEA,201
displaced the potential persuasive authority of the DEA’s data-driven
statement.202
In the medical setting, doctors hear about legal risk from colleagues.203
Counterintuitively, the more that lawyers tell doctors that what they have heard
is untrue, the more the untrue stories may be viewed as accurate. Research on
the persistence of false rumors indicates that refutations of untruths have a
perverse effect. Persons hearing refutations of the false information actually
have a higher retention rate for the false information as true than those who
have heard it denied less often.204 In a similar fashion, there is some evidence
that a message that focuses on the bad apples and on noncompliance as
justification for government action may actually induce higher levels of
noncompliance.205 Furthermore, reassurance from the domain of law is filtered
through medicine’s distrust of law. Doctors do not trust the law or the legal
system to be fair, predictable, or appropriate as it applies to medical practice.
This deep distrust forms a cultural norm that influences how lawyers’
educational efforts about legal requirements will be interpreted and
internalized or rejected in medical practice.206
B.

Immunity

One of the more familiar legislative responses to physician-reported fears
of legal risks is statutory immunity. The Good Samaritan statutes207 are the
classic example, but there are others as well: the intractable pain acts
(governing prescribing of controlled substances);208 the living will statutes

201. See discussion supra INTRODUCTION.
202. See discussion infra Part IV (statistical evaluation of regulatory processes).
203. See discussion supra Part II.B.
204. See, e.g., Farhad Manjoo, Rumor’s Reasons, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2008, at 22.
205. See, e.g., STEPHEN COLEMAN, MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, THE MINNESOTA INCOME
TAX COMPLIANCE EXPERIMENT: STATE TAX RESULTS 5–6 (1996), available at www.taxes.state.
mn.us/taxes/legal_policy/research_reports/content/complnce.pdf. The study noted that reports of
income and actual taxes paid increased among taxpayers who received a letter touting a high level
of compliance with state tax obligations. Id. at 18–19. Taxpayers who received a letter
describing the adverse effect on state budgets when taxpayers failed to pay taxes did not have the
same effect. Id. The study also reported that taxpayers from lower and middle income levels
reported significantly more income and paid more taxes when they received a letter warning them
of an upcoming audit, while higher income taxpayers, as a group, showed no increase in reported
income or taxes paid in response to the letter. Id. See also Valerie Braithwaite et al., Taxation
Threat, Motivational Postures, and Responsive Regulation, 29 L. & POL’Y 137, 138 (2007)
(discussing factors that contribute to compliance and non-compliance).
206. See discussion supra INTRODUCTION.
207. See statutes cited infra note 221.
208. See statutes cited infra note 223.
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(providing immunity for compliance with advance directives);209 the
anatomical gift acts (providing immunity for organ procurement);210 immunity
for peer-review activities;211 immunity for reporting child abuse;212 and so on.
The immunity response would seem to be the strongest legal weapon in
quelling doctors’ fears of legal risk. Yet, the evidence seems to indicate
otherwise.
The Good Samaritan immunity statutes were enacted precisely in response
to physicians’ expressed fears of liability for their efforts to rescue individuals
in medical distress in environments that were unequipped for medical care.213
Studies indicate, however, that these statutes may have little or no effect.214
There is no demonstrable or observable difference in physician response to
emergencies in states with Good Samaritan legislation as compared to those
without such a statute.215 If this research is reliable, why would immunity
statutes have so little apparent impact when they would appear to be so
powerful a shield?216
Immunity statutes are designed to communicate a reassuring message to
physicians; to alleviate fears that lead them to behave in less socially useful
ways. For them to operate as a communicative device, however, physicians
have to be aware of the existence of the statutes.217 In addition, as a
communicative device these statutes may have the unexpected effect of
confirming rather than relieving fears, just as refuting unfounded rumors tends
to reinforce beliefs in the rumors’ truthfulness.218 In addition, an immunity
statute may not be able to overcome distrust of the law. A physician
participating in a focus group on disciplinary actions, for example, stated:

209. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 155.50 (2008) (providing immunity both for complying with a
durable power of attorney for health care and for not complying with it; although the latter
situation requires the doctor to transfer the patient to another’s care).
210. See statutes cited infra note 222.
211. See, e.g., Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat.
3784 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101–11152 (2000)).
212. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11172 (West 2000).
213. Fehlberg, supra note 98, at 497–98 & n.20.
214. Eric A. Brandt, Comment, Good Samaritan Laws—The Legal Placebo: A Current
Analysis, 17 AKRON L. REV. 303, 306 (1983).
215. See Frank B. Mapel, III & Charles J. Weigel, II, Good Samaritan Laws—Who Needs
Them?: The Current State of Good Samaritan Protection in the United States, 21 S. TEX. L.J.
327, 354 (1981).
216. Testing impact can be difficult. For example, intractable pain acts have not appeared
frequently in case law. See, e.g., Hoover, supra note 133, at 1385 (holding that statute rebutted
claim that public policy supported disciplinary action even if act in force at time of doctor’s
actions). But see note 230 and accompanying text and note 234.
217. There may be gaps in informing doctors about such legislation. See discussion supra
note 196.
218. See discussion supra Part II.
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Doctors are asking for reassurance, not more rules or laws. Even the best
intentioned of them [laws and rules], create only more fears in the minds of
doctors trying to do their best, and place more ammunition in the hands of
lawyers and regulators! Doctors will avoid the treatment of pain, so as not to
219
take the chance of “not being in compliance” with some minor detail . . . .

The lack of direct effect on physician behavior after adoption of immunity
legislation should not be interpreted as proof that doctors’ undesirable behavior
is not attributable to “bad law,” but rather is motivated by concerns and
incentives other than law. It certainly is true that many competing, and at
times contradictory, forces influence physician behavior, and it is quite
unlikely that fear of legal entanglement explains everything.220 Viewing
immunity legislation as a controlled experiment that holds all variables
constant but for legal risk, however, does not account for limitations in the
design of such statutes, at least as they apply to health care.
Immunity statutes in the health care context are rarely absolute. At a
minimum, they are always qualified by requirements that the beneficiary of
this protection have acted in good faith; and under some immunity statutes, the
health care provider must have acted reasonably or have met the expected
standard of care. The Good Samaritan statutes, for example, typically provide
immunity only to physicians who have acted in “good faith” and who have not
engaged in gross negligence, recklessness, or intentional misconduct.221 The
organ procurement immunity statutes also typically set what may be
considered the lowest or most easily attainable standard for securing immunity;
i.e., that the party merely have acted in “good faith.”222 The intractable pain
acts are even more qualified, typically providing that the prescribing physician
has immunity if the prescribing meets the standards of the profession or some
other third party standard.223
These qualifiers make the immunity shield considerably smaller and
thinner than one might anticipate. Even if the statute adopts the good faith
219. Martino, supra note 97, at 333 (alteration in original).
220. See discussion supra Part I.
221. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 1627.5 (West Supp. 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. §
537.037.1(1)–(2) (West 2008); ALA. CODE § 6-5-332(e) (LexisNexis 2005); ALASKA STAT. §
09.65.090(d) (2006).
222. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-19-125 (LexisNexis 2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36856(A) (2007); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-39-135(a) (Supp. 2008).
223. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN § 458.326(3) (West 2007) (referring to the “level of care,
skill, and treatment recognized by a reasonably prudent physician under similar conditions and
circumstances”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 630.3066 (2007) (protecting physicians that conform to
regulations adopted by the Board); see also Project on Legal Constraints on Access to Effective
Pain Relief, The Pain Relief Act, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 317, 318 (1996) (providing immunity
for doctors “who can demonstrate by reference to an accepted guideline that his or her practice
substantially complied with that guideline and with the standards of practice” identified in the
Act); Johnson, supra note 125 (discussing the Act and reviewing other state statutes).
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standard for immunity, it does not prevent the filing of a lawsuit,224 nor does it
allow for dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim.225 At best, the qualified immunity
statute requires that discovery proceed and that the claim be considered at the
summary judgment stage, the earliest point at which the facts that relate to
good faith or reasonableness can be determined. A number of cases, in fact,
require that questions of good faith be submitted to the jury.226 For a
population that fears the litigation process, this is too little too late to provide
much reassurance.227
Identifying this limitation in immunity statutes begs the question of why
absolute immunity is not usually considered a workable solution in health care.
In fact, doctors are not the only ones who are afraid. Policymakers are afraid
that doctors completely unleashed will behave badly—or at least some of them
will—and that patients will suffer without legal recourse.228 Agencies
responsible for policing the medical profession are under constant public
pressure to do more, catch more, and be tougher.229 Unfortunately, in the face
of serious risk aversion one cannot both keep doctors on the leash and free
them. This is not to argue that absolute immunity for physicians should be the
norm, but rather that limited immunity is a rather limited response to claims
that the risk of liability and prosecution is causing doctors to neglect or provide
inadequate care to patients. The fact that immunity does not eliminate strategic
behavior on the part of physicians seeking to avoid legal entanglement should
not be surprising.

224. Litigation concerning organ procurement illustrates this point. See, e.g., Ramirez v.
Health Partners of S. Ariz., 972 P.2d 658, 669 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (granting summary judgment
to defendant); Perry v. Saint Francis Hosp., 886 F. Supp. 1551, 1465 (D. Kan. 1995) (denying
summary judgment to hospital); Schembre v. Mid-Am. Transplant Ass’n, 135 S.W.3d 527, 533
(Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (denying summary judgment because good faith is a question of fact
requiring trial); Sattler v. Nw. Tissue Ctr., 42 P.3d 440 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (reversing grant of
summary judgment to defendant on the question of good faith).
225. See, e.g., Hilton v. Children’s Hosp., No. 02-57053, 2004 WL 1700562, at *733 (9th Cir.
July 29, 2004).
226. See Schembre, 135 S.W.3d at 533; Sattler, 42 P.3d at 445.
227. See discussion supra Part II.D (penalties of the process).
228. See Sage, supra note 67, at 499–500 (discussing the focus on compensation of the
individual injured patient as an impediment to good policy in regard to medical malpractice
liability).
229. Public Citizen, for example, issues an annual report on the effectiveness of each state
medical board as measured by the percentage of the state’s doctors who had been disciplined.
SIDNEY M. WOLFE & KATE RESNEVIC, PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP RANKING
OF THE RATE OF STATE MEDICAL BOARDS’ SERIOUS DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS, 2005–2007,
(2008), http://www.citizen.org/documents/medicalboardtable.pdf; see BARDACH & KAGAN,
supra note 34, at 72–74 (discussing the impact of quantitative expectations for number of
citations by inspectors).
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In addition to the obvious intention to influence doctors, immunity statutes
may be intended to communicate to enforcement agencies and potential
plaintiffs. One would expect, for example, that prosecutors and plaintiffs
might account for immunity statutes in deciding whether to prosecute or file
suit at all. Immunity legislation may also be intended to communicate to
regulatory agencies. For example, in the case of the intractable pain acts, the
prospects of legislative action giving doctors immunity from discipline in
particular situations pushed the medical boards toward changing their own
policies to demonstrate to the legislatures that the statutes were not needed. In
fact, the FSMB advised state medical boards to “be proactive in the promotion
of pain management policy initiatives to preclude legislative intervention.”230
From the perspective of advocates for those immunity statutes, the effect on
medical boards itself furthered the achievement of the goals of the legislative
effort.
C. Safe Harbors
Government agencies regularly identify detailed templates for financial
and management arrangements that are deemed to meet the legal requirements
those agencies enforce. These “safe harbors” channel transactions toward the
designs that the agency has determined are acceptable under the law. These
rules are not mandates or prohibitions: safe harbors don’t prohibit providers
from structuring their agreements otherwise, but they provide an official seal
of approval for particular arrangements. They are a voluntary restraint on the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion and make a promise of sanctuary for those
favored transactions. Those doctors who are more entrepreneurial, or more
well-armed with legal and financial counsel, or who have more to gain will test
the waters outside of the transactional safe harbors.
There are some safe harbors in clinical areas as well. Some states have
enacted legislation to create a safe harbor for physicians’ denying their patients
“futile” care.231 Some states have enacted legislation to protect physicians who
comply with particular guidelines from malpractice liability.232 In the area of
prescribing, many state medical boards for some time have informed doctors

230. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., POSITION OF THE FEDERATION OF STATE MEDICAL
BOARDS: IN SUPPORT OF ADOPTION OF PAIN MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES 2 (1998),
http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/1998_grpol_Pain_Management_Guidelines.pdf [hereinafter FSMB,
POSITION IN SUPPORT OF GUIDELINES] (emphasis added).
231. See, e.g., Thaddeus Mason Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor to
Unilaterally Refuse Life-Sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REV. 1 (2007) (criticizing safe harbor
statutes for medical futility decisions as ineffective, with the exception of the Texas statute). The
presumptions attached by statute to signed consent forms could also be viewed as a safe harbor as
they typically do not provide that treatment without a signed form is a battery. They simply
identify a “safest” channel for the practicing doctor. See supra note 41.
232. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 36, at 1516–24.
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that they would not take any action against them for prescribing controlled
substances if their patients had cancer or were terminally ill.233 Further, the
FSMB issued formal guidelines, adopted by many state medical boards, to
assure physicians that their treatment of patients for chronic pain would not
violate the boards’ standards.234
Two physicians considering the potential impact of legal guidelines meant
to provide a safe harbor from regulatory scrutiny speculate from their own
experience that these efforts may have a perverse effect. They observe:
Our experience suggests that many physicians will briefly scan guidelines and
may come away with the wrong impression . . . . It is entirely possible that the
promulgation of guidelines will make physicians perceive that prescribing
opioids for chronic pain is under even greater scrutiny than they thought,
235
causing them to be even less willing to prescribe opioids for any reason.

Whether doctors behave differently in terms of pushing the boundaries of
the templates set in transactional safe harbors, as compared to clinical safe
harbors, is a matter of speculation.236 There is some sense that doctors are
willing to push the envelope on the financial side and in their business
relationships and are less willing to do that, and assume avoidable legal risk, in
their clinical decisions.237 The importance of reputation and the shame

233. David E. Joranson et al., Opioids for Chronic Cancer and Non-Cancer Pain: A Survery
of State Medical Board Members, 79 J. MED. LICENSURE & DISCIPLINE 15 (1992) (reporting on
attitudes of board members). See also Hurwitz v. Bd. of Med., 46 Va. Cir. 119, 1998 WL 972259
(Va. Cir. Ct. Jun. 30, 1998), referring to state’s intractable pain act as a “safe harbor.”
234. FSMB, MODEL POLICY, supra note 135. This policy revises the Model Guidelines for
the Use of Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain. The Policy requires physicians to
take a medical history and perform a physical exam of the patient with some frequency; to
document in the medical record the nature and intensity of the pain and current and past treatment
for pain, related conditions, the effect of pain on function, any history of substance abuse, and at
least one “recognized medical indication” for prescription of a controlled substance; establish a
written treatment plan; secure informed consent; and seek appropriate consultation, among other
items. Id. These guidelines have been adopted in some form by twenty-two state medical boards.
Id. A study of medical board practices concludes that the boards actually relied on such policies
in their disciplinary actions. Hoffmann & Tarzian, supra note 137, at 23.
235. J. David Haddox & Gerald M. Aronoff, Commentary, The Potential for Unintended
Consequences from Public Policy Shifts in the Treatment of Pain, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 350,
351 (1998).
236. It is not clear that transactional safe harbors and clinical safe harbors are functionally the
same either. It might be reasonable to hypothesize that transactional safe harbors can be more
definitive and less ambiguous than clinical safe harbors, for example, so that clinical safe harbors
always bear the burden of uncertainty. This uncertainty in legal standards may produce more
cautious responses. The discussion that follows assumes that the safe harbors function in
essentially the same manner but that doctors react differently.
237. See supra note 31 (discussing the limitations of generalizations about the behavior of
doctors). In particular, some have hypothesized significant differences among doctors in relation
to commercial interests and incentives. See, e.g., Dolgin, supra note 31, at 733–34.
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associated with failures of medical judgment are well-documented.238
Shortcomings in the care of patients go to the very identity of the physician.239
It is possible that the same shame and identity issues are not triggered when
doctors get in trouble for business relationships,240 and so they are quite willing
to push the envelope and bear a risk of legal sanction in the commercial sphere
of their activities.241
A distinction between testing the boundaries of business as compared to
clinical safe harbors also may reflect a rational calculation of risk and benefit.
The upside risk of going beyond the boundaries of business safe harbors is
increased profit and income, a significant temptation of payoff. The upside
risk of pushing the envelope of clinical safe harbors for most doctors is treating
one patient instead of a fungible other who also needs medical care but may be
considered undesirable because of the risk involved. In his concurring opinion
in Conant v. Walters,242 for example, Judge Kozinski notes that:
[T]he doctor’s interest in giving advice about the medical use of marijuana is
somewhat remote and impersonal; they will derive no direct benefit from
giving this advice, other than the satisfaction of doing their jobs well. At the
same time, the burden of the federal policy [of investigating physicians who
recommend marijuana to their patients] . . . falls directly and personally on the
doctors . . . . [T]hey may destroy their careers and lose their livelihoods.
This disparity between benefits and burdens matters because it makes
243
doctors peculiarly vulnerable to intimidation . . . .

238. See COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN
(Linda T. Kohn & Molla S. Donaldson eds., 1999); Robert A. Burt, Doctors vs. Lawyers: The
Perils of Perfectionism, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1177 (2009).
239. Bosk observed that some errors were forgivable and others were not in the context of
residency training. BOSK, supra note 26, at 168–69. Those that could be categorized as moral
failings were unforgivable, but those that were errors in technique or skill were not. Id.; see also
KAPP, supra note 24, at 1 (noting that doctors interpret a malpractice suit as “deeply personal and
intimate, yet simultaneously an embarrassingly public affront against their very integrity and
worth as professionals and as people”).
240. Of course some business relationships, such as self-referrals and other forms of conflicts
of interest, bridge the business and clinical personas. As discussed earlier, however, this
crossover may not be appreciated. See generally Jesse Goldner, Regulating Conflicts of Interest
in Research: The Paper Tiger Needs Real Teeth, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1211 (2009) (discussing the
physician researchers’ conflicts of interest when conducting human subject research).
241. See, e.g., Greaney, supra note 41, at 189 (“[The] Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission . . . have confronted bands of businessmen who have steadfastly refused to
pay attention to legal precedent, repeated governmental pronouncements, and administrative
sanctions imposed on their colleagues[,] . . . [demonstrating] a willingness to blatantly disregard
the law by repeatedly undertaking arrangements already deemed illegal by the enforcers . . . .”
(referring to physicians)).
242. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 639–48 (9th Cir. 2002).
243. Id. at 639–40.
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The development of safe harbors for clinical practice presents an additional
challenge for the quality of medical care. Safe harbors typically are developed
through a stakeholder process involving regulators, prosecutors,
consumers/patients, and those subject to the safe harbor.244 Prosecutors and
regulators have strong motivation to retain a margin of discretion for
themselves to be used in deciding whether or not to prosecute individual cases.
In addition, those charged with enforcing legal standards are quite concerned
with how the safe harbors and guidelines will influence ongoing prosecutions
that they view as falling outside of the safe harbor.245 With the retention of
discretion and success in prosecution as primary and immediate professional
and policy goals, prosecutors would be expected to argue that the safe harbor
should establish boundaries that would be well within the range of what would
ultimately be considered acceptable and legitimate medical practice. Thus, the
clinical safe harbor creates a legally “safest” channel within the range of
acceptable medical practice.
To illustrate: assume a range of interventions from 1 to 100, and that the
range of appropriate treatment lies between 10 and 90. To retain a margin for
prosecutorial or regulatory discretion in individual cases, the clinical safe
harbor is set to cover behavior in the range of 30 to 70. This means that while
doctors practicing in the range between 10 and 30 and between 70 and 90 are
engaged in legitimate medical practice, they simply are not guaranteed
protection from government scrutiny.
The risk-averse doctor who fears investigation and potential prosecution by
enforcement agencies and the rational doctor who calculates the risks and
benefits of choosing to treat one type of patient over another both stay well
within the identified safe harbors. At the same time, risk-averse prosecutors
are setting the boundaries of the safe harbor more narrowly than the bounds of
legal, appropriate, desirable and perhaps necessary medical practice. The
problem with this double risk aversion is that prosecutors’ preservation of
discretion and doctors’ avoidance of legal risk results in a channeling effect
that leaves some patients stranded in the margins. For example, the state
medical board safe harbors for those physicians treating patients who have
cancer or who are terminally ill246 certainly may have reassured doctors and
encouraged them to treat those patients with adequate analgesics; but they may
have likewise driven doctors toward that safest channel and away from chronic

244. The FSMB, for example, gathered state medical board members and investigators, DEA
investigators and administrators, practicing physicians, medical researchers, and patient
advocates, among others, in developing its model guidelines on the use of controlled substances
in pain management. FSMB, POSITION IN SUPPORT OF GUIDELINES, supra note 230, at 1.
245. See Hoffmann, supra note 151, at 245–50, 282 (discussing the Hurwitz case and the
DEA’s withdrawal of the FAQs).
246. See discussion supra Part III.C.
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pain patients, decreasing the availability of necessary treatment for those
patients. Furthermore, the FSMB’s safe harbor sets special requirements for
the treatment of patients who have a “history of substance abuse” or who are at
a “high risk of medication abuse” or who are “at risk of medication misuse,
abuse, or diversion” without further specification.247 At a threshold level,
these descriptors may lead physicians to exclude patients whose general
characteristics, including race, medical condition, or source of pay, are
mistakenly viewed as surrogates for a risk of abuse or diversion of controlled
substances.248 Any patient whose characteristics, medical needs, or other
circumstances place them outside of the safest channel may find it more
difficult to secure appropriate and necessary care even though they fall within
the scope of legitimate medical practice.
While the safe harbor process may intend only to “green light” particular
practices, doctors receiving that signal in the clinical setting may think of the
safe harbors in terms of the familiar green-yellow-red progression. What is not
green must be red or yellow; and it can be dangerous to proceed through a
yellow light, especially with massive on-coming traffic. Safe harbors and
guidelines are comfortable tools for regulators, but at least as to the clinical
safe harbors, some have asserted “bad law” claims; i.e., that they dissuade
good doctors from providing good care. Empirical research that would reveal
whether clinical safe harbors are having the negative channeling effect that
results in limiting appropriate and necessary care is missing. The self-reports
that do exist may be misleading, but if clinical safe harbors induce the
undesired behavior as some have argued, it would be important to know that.
D. Eliminating Asymmetry
At times, legal risk is lined up entirely on one side as the doctor looks at
the risks of particular decisions. For example, in the situation addressed in
Conant v. Walters, only the doctor who discussed the potential of marijuana
for control of particular symptoms or conditions faced the risk of DEA
investigation and prosecution.249 The doctor who remained silent faced no
legal risk at all: the patient could not sue her for failing to disclose a legitimate
treatment and neither the state medical board nor the DEA would make an
inquiry about the adequacy of care. Similarly, when we began our work on
pain management in 1995, only the doctor who prescribed opioids for his

247. See FSMB, MODEL POLICY, supra note 135; see also NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION AND
SUBSTANCE ABUSE, UNDER THE COUNTER: DIVERSION AND ABUSE OF CONTROLLED
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS IN THE U.S. 31 (2005).
248. See Johnson, supra note 95, at 747 (discussing “red-flags,” or indicators, often used
mistakenly to identify patients as suspicious).
249. See discussion supra Part II.D.
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patients in pain faced investigation, sanctions, and liability claims.250 The
doctor who used the less effective medications and neglected their patient’s
pain faced no legal risk at all.
The natural response to legal risk asymmetry is to even things up. In the
pain management field, advocates of improved treatment encouraged medical
boards to discipline physicians for negligent care of patients in pain as a signal
to the profession that failing to prescribe adequate medications
(“underprescibing”) was as risky as “overprescribing.”251 They also increased
the liability risk by bringing high-profile lawsuits in egregious cases of
neglect.252 Eliminating asymmetry was a primary strategy of some advocates
in the case of physical restraints as well. They encouraged and participated in
personal injury lawsuits on behalf of persons injured by restraints253 and
advocated a change in regulations that would set standards and penalties for
the use of restraints. Similarly, individuals concerned that doctors rejected
patients’ or surrogates’ decisions to withdraw consent for continued lifesustaining medical treatment, for fear of criminal prosecution, advocated
recognition of a cause of action for non-compliance with the patient’s or
surrogate’s decision.254
Not surprisingly, these efforts to eliminate asymmetry are not warmly
received in medicine. Instead of viewing these developments as efforts to
balance legal risks rationally, with an eye toward producing better outcomes,
doctors are nihilistic about the operation of law. You’re damned if you do, and
damned if you don’t. 255 What matters is whether eliminating asymmetry has
the desired outcome of improving patient care.

250. See Johnson, supra note 125, at 320; Ben A. Rich, A Prescription for the Pain: The
Emerging Standard of Care for Pain Management, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 49–50 (2000);
Robyn S. Shapiro, Health Care Providers’ Liability Exposure for Inappropriate Pain
Management, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 360, 363 (1996).
251. See Rich supra note 250, at 16 & nn.97–99, 69 & n.374.
252. See id. at 84, 90 (discussing Bergman v. Chin, No. H205732-1 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super.
Ct. Feb. 16, 1999); Estate of Henry James v. Hillhaven Corp., No. 89 CVS 64 (N.C. Super. Ct.
Jan. 15, 1991)); Shapiro, supra note 250, at 361 (discussing Estate of Henry James, No. 89 CVS
64)).
253. Julie A. Braun & Elizabeth A. Capezuti, The Legal and Medical Aspects of Physical
Restraints and Bed Siderails and Their Relationship to Falls and Fall-Related Injuries in Nursing
Homes, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 22–25 (2000) (describing litigation involving injuries
due to restraints).
254. See generally Samuel Oddi, The Tort of Interference with the Right to Die: The Wrongful
Living Cause of Action, 75 GEO. L.J. 625 (1986) (describing such cases).
255. Matthew Yi, Doctor Found Reckless for Not Relieving Pain, S.F. CHRON., June 14,
2001, at A1.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1024

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:973

IV. REFRAMING EVALUATION AND SURVEILLANCE
This paper has argued that doctors’ “bad law” claims can carry important
information that is critical to the achievement of the goals of regulation. Some
of these claims reveal concrete problems in the implementation of regulatory
standards, including the “shadow systems” that lurk below the formal surface
of the regulatory system.256 Taking doctors’ “bad law” claims seriously
requires that we expand our notions of and methods for measuring the
effectiveness of law. It also requires that enforcement policies take account of
predictable risk-avoidance behavior.
A.

Defining and Measuring Effectiveness

Empirical research on physician response to legal risk is thin, and
motivations are likely to be complex. It seems entirely believable, however,
that fears over the prospect of legal entanglement and potential sanctions may
influence doctors to alter their practices in undesirable ways. Just as medical
treatment produces iatrogenic harm, legal regimes intended to protect patients
from bad doctors or doctors behaving badly can have negative spillover
effects. Arguing that something is likely is not the same as having convincing
proof that it is so, however. Empirical research focused specifically on the
question of physician behavior in response to legal risk can contribute to the
effort to align regulatory effects with regulatory goals.
Framing empirical research on the impact of law in terms of the individual
case—did this case appropriately apply the standard to this particular doctor—
is too narrow. Individualized case-based analysis can make a contribution to
our understanding of the content and application of the law by the courts or
agencies in their adjudicative function,257 but it does not give us a window into
the impact of that law on physician practices and, thus, the law’s impact on
access to and quality of care. Statistical analysis of the incidence of
enforcement activities—what proportion of doctors are disciplined by the
state’s medical board in comparison to other states,258 for example, or what
amount of federal monies are recovered in fraud prosecutions259—certainly
broadens the frame away from the individual case. When statistical analysis

256. See discussion supra Part II.
257. Even as to this question, the study of cases is limited. See Sage, supra note 82, at 50.
258. See, e.g., WOLFE & RESNEVIC, supra note 229 (providing an annual report on the
number and percentage of doctors disciplined, and evaluation of states based on those numbers).
259. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD
AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM: ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2007, at 6–8 (2008), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/hcfacreport2007.pdf.
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operates without a notion of what the “right” number is, however, it is not
helpful260 and can be harmful.261
Neither of these two concepts—defining effectiveness in terms of
application to the individual case or in terms of statistical data about the
incidence of enforcement actions—is adequate. Whether taken separately or
together, these concepts of effectiveness do not take account of how the
regulations and enforcement efforts influence the behavior of physicians who
are not caught in the proceedings that produce the individual case or the
statistical analysis of enforcement actions. They cannot measure changes in
physician risk-avoidance behavior that may be producing lower quality or less
accessible care. We want to deter bad doctors and bad behavior, but we also
have to assess what impact the regulatory system is having on the good doctor
and good behavior left undone. The evaluation of the law as applied should be
reframed to examine the population-based effects on the behavior of
physicians, adopting a public health model for the effect of law, despite the
considerable challenges in doing so.262
B.

Accounting for Behavior Patterns

Some features of physician behavior in reaction to legal risk should be
accepted as they are. This call to take doctors’ “bad law” claims seriously and
to accept certain behavior patterns does not argue that regulatory standards and
goals should be abandoned. Rather, an understanding of the reactive, risk-

260. The GAO, for example, issued two reports concerning the effectiveness of federal-state
efforts to enforce quality standards for nursing homes. Acknowledging that the number of
nursing homes cited for deficiencies decreased between 1999 and 2005, the GAO reports that the
reduction in cited deficiencies does not correlate, in their view, with improvements in the quality
of care but rather with less effective inspection and enforcement systems. U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NURSING HOMES: CONTINUED ATTENTION IS NEEDED TO IMPROVE THE
QUALITY OF CARE IN SMALL BUT SIGNIFICANT SHARE OF HOMES (2007); U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT HAVE NOT
DETERRED SOME HOMES FROM REPEATEDLY HARMING RESIDENTS (2007). In contrast, the
Department of Health and Human Services reported that the quality of nursing homes actually has
improved. Nursing Home Quality Improves, HHS Says in Announcing Expanded Initiative, 14
Health L. Rep. (BNA) 34 (Jan. 6, 2005).
261. See BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 34, at 73–74 (discussing the impact of counting
citations on surveillance behavior).
262. This argument may also be situated in a public health approach to the impact of law just
as medicine is being challenged to reframe itself toward a public health methodology that looks at
population-based outcomes rather than only the individual patient. See, e.g., Barbara A. Noah,
Adverse Drug Reactions: Harnessing Experiential Data to Promote Patient Welfare, 49 CATH. U.
L. REV. 449, 450–51 (2000) (“Providers have strongly protested the allocation of health services
on a population-wide basis under managed care . . . . [B]ut the collection, analysis, and
dissemination of information relating to adverse drug reactions demands an emphasis on
population-based outcomes and utility.” (footnote omitted)).
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avoidance behavior of doctors should be used strategically to enhance the
effectiveness of the regulatory effort.263 In particular, this understanding and
accommodation should assure that policy goals are not hijacked by the
enforcement process. This paper has argued at several points that mid-level
decisions and policies concerning enforcement practices—what is monitored
or required to be reported; who is investigated; what rituals and processes
accompany the investigation—can have a profound effect on physician
behavior in avoiding particular patients or practices. In particular, monitoring
and investigation processes are likely to have a substantial influence on
physician behavior that can lead to undesired consequences.
1.

Monitoring

Simply watching someone, or persuading someone that they are being
watched, makes the person change their behavior. Visible surveillance is a
powerful tool of social control.264 Regulatory monitoring, thus, should be
viewed as a tool to determine behavior rather than simply a source of
information.

263. Cf. FURROW ET AL., supra note 36, at 163–67 (comparing nursing homes to hospitals
and arguing that differences between the two explain observed differences in the nature of
regulatory design for each). See generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 4 (1992) (arguing that regulatory
design should take account of industry structure, motivations of regulated agents, and industry
conduct). Contrary to the argument in this paper that established behavior patterns should be
used where possible to make regulation more effective, Jolls and Sunstein argue that the law can
be used to “debias” familiar heuristics. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through
Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 207–19 (2006). Critiques of the application of cognitive theory to
regulation might argue that the approach recommended here manipulates human behavior. See,
e.g., Wilson, supra note 103, at 224 (responding to claims that designing regulatory systems to
respond to heuristics identified by cognitive research is exploitative).
264. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as the “Hawthorne Effect,” stemming from
behavioral research at the Hawthorne Works factory outside of Chicago in the early 1900s in
which researchers observed improvements in worker productivity that could be attributed only to
the fact that the workers knew that they were being evaluated. See Stephen R.G. Jones, Was
There a Hawthorne Effect?, 98 AM. J. SOC. 451, 451 (1992). The concept has been tested in a
variety of settings. See, e.g., Carol L. Freund et al., Natural Settings Trials—Improving the
Introduction of Clinical Genetic Tests, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 106, 108 (2004) (discussing the
ethical challenges of accounting for the Hawthorne Effect in clinical trials); Herbert Sherman,
Surveillance Effects on Community Physician Test Ordering, 22 MED. CARE 80 (1984)
(documenting effects of surveillance on physician behavior in ordering a diagnostic test); see also
infra notes 266–72 and accompanying text (discussing prescription monitoring). Some criticism
of the Hawthorne Effect as a viable methodological theory has emerged. See, e.g., Jones, supra,
at 452; Michael C. Dorf, After Bureaucracy, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1269–70 (2004) (book
review).
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Doctors may be hypersensitive and culturally resistant to any external
oversight of their actions.265 If this position on their part is morally or
politically offensive, the regulatory battle can be engaged as a matter of
principle: we have a duty to make you accountable, and so shall you be. If
instead, better patient care or a better health care system remains the priority, a
more pragmatic approach should be adopted. If the reactive behavior change is
desired, monitoring becomes an effective tool; if instead, the monitoringstimulated behavior change is undesirable, visible monitoring becomes an
impediment to achievement of the primary goal.
Prescription monitoring offers a useful example.266 Every state engages in
some system of monitoring to collect individualized data on doctors’
prescribing of controlled substances. Until the late 1990s, many of these
efforts were paper-based systems in which doctors produced three paper copies
of the prescription (one for the pharmacy, one for the doctor’s files, and one
for the state).267 Doctors could not avoid being aware of government oversight
of each prescription they wrote. Both survey data about self-reported changes
in prescribing268 and quantitative data about volume and frequency in
prescribing of particular medications269 showed that these paper monitoring
systems actually reduced the prescription of controlled substances. If the goal
of the monitoring system was to reduce the availability of controlled
substances, this effect was a success. It is a passive and inexpensive

265. See Deborah A. Savage, Professional Sovereignty Revisited: The Network
Transformation of American Medicine?, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 661, 671, 674 (2004)
(discussing network theory as a support for the primacy of peer monitoring in medicine and the
rejection of managerial or other outsider monitoring); see also Bruce E. Landon et al., Changes in
Career Satisfaction Among Primary Care and Specialist Physicians, 1997–2001, 289 JAMA 442,
447 (2003) (relating satisfaction primarily to autonomy and the ability to provide high quality
care); Jin Lei, Clinical Autonomy and the Rationalization of Clinical Practice (Aug. 14, 2004)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_
citation/1/1/0/3/8/p110387_index.html.
266. Mandatory reporting systems are monitoring systems, and so can operate in the same
fashion. See supra notes 147–150 and accompanying text (discussing mandatory reporting in the
context of physical restraints).
267. This particular paper-based monitoring system was called the triplicate prescription
system. Another paper-based system required that physicians use state-issued sequentially
numbered prescription slips for prescriptions of certain medications categorized as controlled
substances.
268. David B. Brushwood, Maximizing the Value of Electronic Prescription Monitoring
Programs, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 41, 46–47 (reporting on data that shows that prescribing of
pain medications increased in states that moved from paper-based prescription monitoring
systems to electronic systems).
269. See, e.g., ABA COMM’N ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE ELDERLY, REPORT TO THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES: PROPOSED ABA POLICY ON LEGAL OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE PAIN
MANAGEMENT (2000), available at http://www.abanet.org/aging/resources/docs/policyfinal.doc
(citing studies that show that paper-based monitoring “may deter legitimate prescribing”).
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enforcement system because no one even has to actually review the material
produced in order for the system to have its targeted effect. Reducing the
prescribing of controlled substances for the treatment of pain, however, is not
consistent with the goal of improving patient care.270
The switch to an electronic monitoring system,271 which does not involve
any action by the physician, appears not to have the same effect on the volume
and frequency of prescribing.272 If the goal of the system is appropriate
prescribing, rather than a simple reduction in volume, an invisible system
better achieves that goal without hampering oversight.
A visible monitoring system has an independent impact on physician
behavior and produces an outcome that may either reinforce or undermine the
goals of regulating physician prescribing. Whether the monitoring system
should be visible or invisible can be resolved on an entirely pragmatic level. A
pragmatic approach would accept physician sensitivity to external oversight as
a given. Rather than exhorting doctors to practice good medicine without fear,
advocates for better care can accommodate the monitoring system to physician
behavior and better accomplish their goals.273
The choice between visible and invisible monitoring systems, however,
requires clarity in the substantive goals of the particular regulation. If the
desire is to reduce the prescription of narcotics, for example, a very visible
monitoring system that reminds physicians daily that they are being watched
should be chosen. If the concern is that reduction in the prescription of
narcotics results in poor care because doctors are not prescribing necessary
medication, however, one would choose an invisible monitoring system, all
other things being equal.274 Of course, electronic prescription monitoring

270. David E. Joranson & Aaron M. Gilson, Regulatory Barriers to Pain Management, 14
ONCOLOGY NURSING 158 (1998) (reporting on the large body of research documenting adverse
effects on prescribing: “although administrators of [paper-based] prescription monitoring
programs assert that quality of care is not compromised, empirical evidence suggests otherwise”).
271. See, e.g., Nathaniel Katz et al., Update on Prescription Monitoring in Clinical Practice:
A Survey Study of Prescription Monitoring Program Administrators, 9 PAIN MED. 587 (2008)
(reporting on the operation of electronic monitoring programs).
272. See Brushwood, supra note 268, at 44–45. Brushwood notes, however, that the evidence
of increase in prescribing may not be directly related to the change in monitoring, as there may
have been other influences as well. Id. at 47. It may be that as doctors come to “see” the
monitoring, its invisibility will dissipate and the monitoring effect on behavior will set in; but this
does not undermine the point made here.
273. For discussion in another context, see Fazal Khan, The Human Factor: Globalizing
Ethical Standards in Drug Trials Through Market Exclusion, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 877, 911
(2008), suggesting that visible observation might be used to increase compliance with regulatory
standards for drug trials. See also Johnson, supra note 93 (describing impact of monitoring of
hospital length-of-stay on physician behavior).
274. This article addresses only the issue of monitoring physician prescribing and not the
monitoring of patient behavior in regard to prescriptions. In addition, the electronic system will
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raises its own complicated issues relating to the appropriateness and accuracy
of the data collected and the use to which it is put.275 Prescription monitoring,
however, illustrates both the strategic accommodation to physician behavior to
achieve regulatory effectiveness, and the policy issues that must be decided in
evaluating the operation of the monitoring system.
2.

Investigation

Doctors also fear being subjected to government inquiry or investigation.
The costs of the inquiry or investigation include financial costs, disruption of
the practice, damage to reputation, resultant ostracism or termination of
necessary business relationships, stress, shame, and other losses that are quite
significant.276 At the same time, regulators enforcing standards want to assure
that they uncover the few bad apples and so may cast a broad investigative net.
This broad net would be expected to catch the small number of violators, but it
would also be expected to catch a number of doctors who will not be charged
with violations. The regulator who justifies casting the investigative net
broadly as triggering “only” an inquiry or further investigation but not
necessarily sanctions fails to appreciate the substantial penalties that are
inherent in the investigation itself. The intent of the law—protection of
patients—is subverted by a “catch-and-release” surveillance system.
A rational reaction to the personal costs of inquiry or investigation, which
are well-understood by doctors, is to alter their practice and treatment

produce data that is much more easily used in the enforcement process, so concerns over the
quality and use of the data remain. As a monitoring device standing alone, the invisible program
has the advantage of avoiding perverse effects on physician prescribing. See Brushwood, supra
note 268, at 41 (arguing that such systems should be evaluated on whether they are safe (in terms
of avoidance of adverse consequences such as invasions of patient privacy and interference with
legitimate prescribing in the way that the data is used) and effective (in terms of reducing abuse
of controlled substances)). See also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (considering the
constitutionality of New York’s triplicate prescription monitoring system).
275. This discussion leaves open the question of whether the data collected is appropriate and
accurate and whether it is used in an appropriate manner. To some extent, of course, the capacity
of the electronic system itself becomes a driving source for ever-expanding use of the data.
Electronic prescription monitoring systems are subject to failures in the quality and accuracy of
the data collected as well as abuses in the use of the data against physicians and patients. See,
e.g., Katz et al., supra note 271, at 592–93 (describing some of these concerns as to how the
electronic systems are operating in this regard). The electronic system’s responsiveness to
concerns over the negative influence of paper systems on physician prescribing may be offset by
the effects on prescribing that the particular uses of the data may produce. Physicians may have
the capacity to monitor each patient’s complete prescription profile, an outcome that seems
consistent with health concerns, but may then use exclusionary criteria for treatment that do not
relate to medical concerns or evidence-based standards of care. See Brushwood, supra note 268,
at 44–45.
276. See discussion supra Part II.D.
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decisions to avoid being caught in the net at all.277 “Net avoidance” can mean
that doctors will avoid particular patients or particular treatments that in fact
are legitimate and are quite unlikely to result in formal sanctions.278 This
reaction to the prospects of investigation thus can cause harm, in terms of
reduced access or lower quality of care, and can undermine the ultimate goal of
improving patients’ health and well-being.
For example, state medical boards and the DEA routinely mine data from
the prescription monitoring systems279 to identify those doctors who write the
higher volumes of prescriptions for controlled substances in their geographic
area. Doctors on the high side of prescribing are then subjected to further
inquiry and investigation. Net avoidance would explain, then, why doctors
want to stay in the middle of the pack in their prescribing. Unfortunately,
however, the middle of the pack may be practicing bad medicine by failing to
provide adequate treatment for their patients—denying them effective
medication.280 At a minimum, regulators should set the parameters for
investigation and inquiry as narrowly as possible to achieve the goals that they
desire, and in a fashion that does not contradict the formal legal standard.
They should recognize that they have to balance the risk that some violators
will not be caught if the investigative parameters are too narrow with the risk
that the majority of doctors will gear their practice to avoid being investigated.
In addition, they should not use indicators, such as the prescription volume,
that standing alone have little to do with whether the physician is practicing
good or bad medicine.
Of course, instead of adjusting their use of inquiries and investigations,
regulators could maintain an aggressive investigation stance and try to educate
doctors about the importance of the agency’s efforts and to reassure them that
“good doctors” are safe. These efforts are quite likely to be ineffective.281
This is the course that the DEA has adopted, for example.282 The agency could
make sure that doctors understand that their being investigated is not a finding

277. See discussion supra Part III.
278. See discussion supra Part III.C.
279. See Brushwood, supra note 268, at 45–47 (discussing the use of data by the DEA and
several states to determine the success of paper-based prescription monitoring systems); supra
Part IV.B.1.
280. See discussion of early adopters, supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text; supra note
119 and accompanying text concerning overcompliance; and supra notes 147–50 and
accompanying text concerning use of restraints.
281. See discussion supra Part III.ASimilarly, as used as an indicator, the percentage of
nursing home residents who were physically restrained did not reflect quality of care, nor did it
negate the influence of claimed “bad laws” on perpetuating the practice. See supra notes 147–
150 and accompanying text.
281. See discussion supra Part III.A.
282. See News Release, supra note 198.
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of guilt, even though there is some evidence that health care organizations of
their peers may take action based on the investigation alone283 and that the
agency may thereafter view the doctor as suspicious.284 No amount of
reassurance is likely to persuade a doctor that an inquiry or investigation by the
state medical board or the DEA is not threatening and damaging. Regulation
that is goal-oriented will account for these reactions in selecting the parameters
for triggering an investigation or inquiry.
CONCLUSION
Even firm supporters of regulatory efforts, including this author, must
accept that well-intentioned regulatory standards and enforcement systems can
have negative outcomes as physicians react, and patients suffer as a result.
Taking physicians’ “bad law” complaints seriously brings physician behavior
to the table as a credible and legitimate factor in evaluating the performance of
the law. Physicians’ “bad law” claims, if treated like sentinel events that
require further investigation, can provide critical and otherwise unattainable
information about the operation of legal standards. In addition, physician
response to a specific regulation or enforcement system, including riskavoidance behavior that reduces the availability of appropriate care, may alter
the risk-benefit calculus for particular standards. Taking “bad law” claims
seriously appreciates that the behavior-inducing effects of the enforcement
effort may thwart the goals of the regulation itself.
Our common responses to physicians’ “bad law” complaints are not as
effective as they may appear. We need new tools, and one of those tools may
be a better understanding of how doctors alter their behavior in relation to legal
risk. This paper has demonstrated, for example, that better understanding of
physician reaction to monitoring and investigations should influence how
surveillance is conducted.
Even assuming perfect information and perfect alignment of tools and
goals, however, persons concerned with the impact of law on physician
behavior face at least two persistent challenges. First, empirical research on
the influences on physician behavior consistently reveals multiple motivations,
and it is unlikely that addressing legal concerns alone will make significant
change. Still, a hammer is what law reformers have, and so some
responsibility for its strokes lies there. Second, some of the negative effects of
regulating physician behavior are irreducible. Law is not a precision
instrument, and some degree of negative consequences, at the margins at least,

283. See Goldner, supra note 74, at 342–43 (detailing organizational responses to physicians
cleared in investigations for scientific misconduct).
284. See BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 34, at 73.
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seems unavoidable. Reducing negative consequences is worthwhile however,
even if zero tolerance is impractical.
A better understanding of physician behavior in the face of legal risk
would allow us to improve the effectiveness of law in achieving desired goals.
This better understanding begins with taking physicians’ “bad law” claims
seriously, neither dismissing them too easily nor taking them at face value.
Still, the health law reform effort remains a normative and political exercise;
and social, political, and ethical norms influence the standards we choose to set
for medicine. In some circumstances, consequences will be viewed as
unimportant, but better that they are known than unknown when that choice is
made.

